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Abstract 
The studies compiled in this dissertation examine the intersection of mass partisanship 
and social movements. I hypothesize that certain types of movement actions (i.e. 
“disruptive”, violent, and cooperative protest) generate greater partisan polarization. I 
further hypothesize that more disruptive protests decrease tolerance for 
authoritarianism amongst partisans. Finally, I compare the effects of different types of 
protest on movement support across partisan groups. That is, I consider the tradeoffs 
that protest organizers face between generating support and generating partisan-based 
hostility. I base this study on an emerging social identity approach to mass partisanship, 
which clearly predicts that extreme protests increase outgroup threat, thus leading to 
more negative attitudes toward the outgroup. Likewise, the social identity approach to 
mass partisanship suggests that protest effectiveness should be moderated by the 
extremity of protest tactics. I situate this study within the social conflict—and associated 
protests—around global climate change. Using a large, online survey experiment (N = 
2764), I expose participants to media coverage of three types of protest events: 
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disruptive and violent, disruptive and non-violent, and non-disruptive non-violent. 
There is also a fourth control condition. Using a series of regression models, I 
demonstrate what effects these treatments have on (1) partisan polarization, (2) social 
dominance orientation, and (3) movement support/opposition. 
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Introduction 
This study takes up the relationship between social movements and political 
partisanship. Surprisingly, this is a less frequently studied relationship than we might 
assume. Perhaps this is because it is merely taken for granted that social movements are 
partisan and that we can all intuitively identify along which partisan lines various 
prominent movements fall. Perhaps it is because of academic silos: partisanship tends to 
be studied within political science while social movements are the arena of sociology. 
Regardless of the reasons for this gap, my aim is to demonstrate why it matters for both 
the study of partisanship and the study of social movements.  
So, what do we know about the relationship between partisanship and social 
movements? In their recent book, McAdam and Kloos (2014) demonstrate how social 
movements influenced the polarization of the present day American political parties 
(see also McAdam and Tarrow 2012; McVeigh, Cunningham, and Farrell 2014; 
Rosenfeld 2017). In their view, movements act as “centrifugal forces” in politics, 
pushing party platforms away from the center and toward activist positions on the 
party’s flanks. When this happens on one or both sides of the party divide, parties move 
away from one another, i.e. party polarization. The relationship between social 
movements and polarization represents a crucial piece of social movement scholars’ 
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renewed interest in the general relationship between movements and party politics (see 
Hutter, Kriesi, and Lorenzini 2018 for discussion). 
However, partisan polarization is not merely a party-level phenomenon. There has been 
substantial debate about the existence of public partisan polarization over the last two 
decades (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Fiorina and 
Abrams 2008; Iyengar and Westwood 2015), but recent evidence demonstrates that the 
American public has in fact grown more polarized. The catch is that this polarization is 
quite different than anticipated by past debates. Rather than becoming more polarized 
on issues of policy or ideology in the way party leaders have, most Americans’ partisan 
polarization is social (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; 
Mason 2018; Westwood et al. 2018; Iyengar et al. 2018). Social polarization refers to 
negative feelings toward partisans and a desire to distance oneself from them socially. 
That is, we just don’t like people from the other party, we don’t want to be around 
them, and these feelings are not rooted in disagreements about policy or ideology.  
The effects of social polarization are potentially severe. By definition, social polarization 
means that we are generically less likely to want to interact with members of the other 
party (Iyengar et al. 2012; Mason 2018). This generic avoidance impacts more specific 
social interactions, including dating (Gift and Gift 2015; Nicholson et al. 2016), marriage 
(Iyengar et al. 2012), the job market (Huber and Malhotra 2016; McConnell et al. 2018), 
and even talking to outgroup partisans (Chen and Rohla 2018). In a series of 
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experiments, Iyengar and Westwood (2015) find that partisan bias in the job market 
may even be stronger than racial bias! But perhaps the most significant problem with 
social polarization is its implications for our democracy. Social polarization is associated 
with lower trust in a governing outgroup party (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015) and it 
may yield more polarized politicians and tolerance of democratic norm-breaking 
(Mason 2018). As Iyengar et al. (2018) note: 
“…we suspect that affective polarization increases support for extremist 
politicians, or, at least, blinds partisans to the ideological extremity of 
candidates from their party. In terms of the latter, we suspect that affective 
polarization increases partisans’ willingness to conform to their party’s 
policy positions. Hence, affective polarization may yield extreme 
politicians, who then send policy cues to their base, exacerbating mass 
ideological polarization.” 
But how do social movements fit into this disconcerting story? Even though it is now 
well documented that movements influence party polarization, why should we suspect 
that movements influence partisan polarization amongst the public? After all, these 
processes may act independently.  
Several broad findings in social movement scholarship attest to the likelihood that 
movements influence public partisan polarization. The first is that public opinion is 
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both an established movement outcome (Andrews, Beyerlein, and Farnum 2016; 
Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Rochon 2000) and a condition for movement success 
(Agnone 2007; Burstein and Linton 2002). Movements bring issues to public attention 
through protest by garnering media attention (Koopmans 2004; Vliegenthart, Oegema, 
and Klandermans 2005). Media attention can merely raise the salience of an issue or 
allow movements to actively frame it by emphasizing particular features of the issue 
(Chong and Druckman 2007; McCammon 2009). Simply, we know that social 
movements influence the attitudes, beliefs, and actions of the public and not only elites 
and policymakers (see also Banaszak and Onderchin 2016; Enos, Kaufman and Sands 
2017; Dumas 2018).  
But public opinion is quite distinct from social polarization. Studies on social 
movements and public opinion have focused on attention to and support for a 
movement’s objectives and positions. So, while research shows that movements can 
influence the public’s attitudes, more is needed to justifiably hypothesize that 
movements influence social polarization. Social polarization is about intergroup 
dynamics and the presence of strong and competing social identities (see Huddy and 
Bankert 2017; Huddy 2018; and Mason 2018 for detailed discussions; also see discussion 
in literature review). Research on social identity sees conflict emerging between 
ingroups and outgroups over competition for resources and/or status. When strong 
group boundaries become salient, the members of those groups experience heightened 
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prejudice and tendencies toward discrimination of the outgroup. Likewise, negative 
feelings toward the outgroup increase, while positive feelings toward the ingroup 
increase. The world becomes a conflict of us-vs-them, Sharks vs Jets, Democrats vs 
Republicans. That is, social polarization.  
If movements are likely to influence social polarization, it may occur because social 
movement also become entangled in social groups and identities (Bernstein 2008; 
Klandermans 2014; Polletta and Jasper 2001). Research shows that movements use 
identity to actively create perceptions of ingroup and outgroup conflict. That is, identity 
is a tool for movements to cast a conflict as “us-vs-them”, motivating support and 
action through the activation of social identities and group boundaries (Hunt and 
Benford, 1994; Klandermans, 1997; Polleta and Jasper, 2000; Tilly, 2003; Vestergren, 
Drury, and Chiriac, 2018). When movements intersect with partisan politics—as they do 
in the cases of prominent movements around civil rights (e.g. Black Lives Matter), 
abortion, or climate change—identification with the movement and party become 
muddled. Partisan movements activate partisan identities. Simply, social movements 
capitalize on group-based identities that overlap with partisanship, feeding the 
intergroup conflict that drives social polarization.  
And so finally we arrive at the central question of this dissertation: Do social 
movements influence the social polarization of the American public? Taking as a 
starting point the aforementioned entanglement of movements, public opinion, 
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partisanship, and social identity, we certainly have grounds to suspect they might. The 
first chapter of this study explores this central question as well as one mechanism 
through which movements may cause heterogenous effects on polarization: protest 
tactics. Given the open questions around social polarization and democracy, I also 
examine how social movements influence the public’s tolerance for authoritarian 
behavior and the role that partisanship plays in this process.  
To compliment my examination of movements and social polarization, I will also 
examine how movements impact public support in the context of hyper-partisanship.  
In the third study, I examine how varying protest tactics influence support for the 
movement across partisan identities. Movements use tactics strategically, but the effects 
of these tactics may trade increased support and mobilization for greater social 
polarization. Conversely, it may be that the same tactics yield both increased support 
and have a lighter or null effect on polarization.  
In the preceding chapters I will offer more targeted, detailed reviews of these questions 
and why they matter for the study of movements and partisanship. A literature review 
is provided in the next section that covers, in detail, the theoretical and topical 
knowledge underlying my empirical work. Each empirical section begins with an 
outline of the theoretical logic and importance of each study, building on and referring 
back to the literature review.  
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Following the three empirical studies, I offer in the discussion section a challenge for 
movement leaders and scholars to consider the unanticipated consequences of 
movement actions. The study of movement impacts has largely been confined to 
impacts on policy, public support for the movement, and on movement actors. While 
some typologizing has been done on types of movement effects, an underlying goal of 
this dissertation is to push scholars and activists to consider the “perverse” effects of 
social movements on society. I suggest here that social polarization is one such perverse 
effect, but that many others likely exist. In the discussion section I attempt to articulate 
what is meant by a perverse social movement effect and provide guidance on this 
concept and how it may be integrated into the extent research literature.   
A final note: this dissertation focuses on the case of climate change activism and the 
social movement that surrounds it. Climate change is a profoundly partisan issue. If I 
had chosen activism around civil rights, racial resentment would have proven a 
significant confounding factor. If I had chosen abortion, religion would have proven a 
powerful confounder. In the case of climate change, the social identity most powerfully 
influencing attitudes, beliefs, and actions is partisanship, as an abundance of research 
demonstrates (see Borick et al. 2018 for a recent discussion). While the implications of 
this study could certainly be applied specifically to “environmental” or climate 
activism, I wish to avoid reducing the impact of this work. Focusing on environmental 
issues has long provided broad, generic insights into social theory (e.g. McCright and 
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Dunlap 2010; Gamson 1975) and bounding the insights of this study would ultimately 
be arbitrary and justifiable only on disciplinary grounds. My hope is that this study 
contributes to a broader discussion on how partisanship intersects not only 
environmental social movements, but all social movements, and possibly other forms of 
environmental and social conflict.  
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Literature review 
Social movements: a review 
Definitions of social movements are heterogenous across the scholarly landscape (see 
Tarrow, 1998; McAdam and Snow, 1997; Benford and Snow, 2000), but as Snow et al 
(2004) points out, these definitions generally engage several dimensions: 
“Although the various definitions of movements may differ in terms of 
what is emphasized or accented, most are based on three or more of the 
following axes: collective or joint action; change-oriented goals or claims; 
some extra- or non-institutional collective action; some degree of 
organization; and some degree of temporal continuity.” (p. 6) 
Aside from their internal qualities, we can also think of social movements as they relate 
to their environment. Social movements are cornerstones of modern life. Meyer and 
Tarrow (1998) go so far as to argue that we exist in a “movement society” (particularly 
in the West), where participation in organized collective action is ubiquitous (also see 
Eder, 2003). Social movements are not simply vehicles for discreet concerns to be 
addressed, but are more generally a structural feature of democratic life (Goldstone, 
2003). They are how the marginalized and/or aggrieved give voice and authority to 
their cause and, at times, change policy and culture. Social movements may directly 
seek policy change, but they are not solely oriented toward political processes and 
22 
 
operate at least in part outside of formal political processes (Gamson, 1975). Rather than 
engaging institutionalized processes, social movements may engage the broader society 
and culture through public displays such as protests or marches. The use of public 
display is part of a social movement’s “repertoires of contention” (Tilly 1995), or the 
suite of tactics that movements use to achieve strategic ends. Thus, Snow (2004) offers 
us the following working definition of social movements: 
“Social movements can be thought of as collectivities acting with some degree 
of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels 
for the purpose of challenging or defending extent authority, whether it is 
institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or 
world order of which they are a part.” (p. 11) 
We can further expand our understanding of social movements by asking how social 
movements come to exist and function. Several complimentary (and sometimes 
competing) frameworks exist, typically distilled as follows: resource mobilization, with 
an emphasis on the importance of organization (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Zald, 1992; 
Edwards and McCarthy, 2004), political opportunity or process (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, 
1995; Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996; McAdam, 1982), and cultural framing (Benford and 
Snow, 2000). Each of these positions contributes to our understanding of social 
movements in different ways, and each offers considerable insight into how social 
movements matter.  
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The resource mobilization perspective emphasizes the role of organizational capacity to 
mobilize several types of resources that can be put to use by a given movement. Several 
elements of this description deserve individual attention. The resources employed by a 
given movement manifest in different types. Edwards and McCarthy (2004) offer us a 
typology of five distinct resources: moral, cultural, social-organizational, material, and 
human. Moral resources include, predominantly, legitimacy (Gillham and Edwards, 
2011), but also include solidarity, celebrity, and sympathy (Cress and Snow, 1996). 
Cultural resources are a form of knowledge that allow a movement to accomplish a 
given specialized task, such as organizing an event or interacting with the media 
(Oliver and Marwell, 1992). Social-organizational refers to access to infrastructures, 
organizations, and social networks and the further resources they provide. Human 
resources refer to labor, skills, expertise, and leadership. Finally, material resources 
refer to financial and physical capital. Access to these resources helps us to 
fundamentally understand how bystanders become participants. 
In order to acquire resources, social movements must take on some organizational form. 
What form is taken can be driven by mimetic or isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983) or by rational strategic decisions (McCarthy and Zald, 2001). 
Organizational form in part determines what resources a social movement has access 
too. For instance, Skocpol (1999) shows how professionalization can constrain access to 
financial support from a broad base of individual supporters. The argument embedded 
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in the resource mobilization approach is that by organizing into formal groups, social 
movement organizations can rally resources to achieve explicit goals, including the 
recruitment and retainment of supporters.  
Resources can be distributed by internal actors, but they are often produced 
exogenously. Moral resources, for instance, are bestowed upon social movements by 
cultural elites who possess moral authority. Comparatively, cultural resources are those 
that can be deployed from within the movement and are not subject to retraction from 
an external entity. Most social movements acquire resources through both internal and 
external means. Likewise, access to resources can be considered proprietary (i.e. access 
by a given movement can be restricted by external actors) and non-proprietary (i.e. 
access cannot be controlled by external actors). Resources are also unequally 
distributed: middle class support for social movements is vital for just this reason, as 
this group has access to many of the types of resources thus far specified. The efforts of 
external entities, such as the state or other powerful organizations, can act as both 
barriers and opportunities for social movements to gain access to resources. The 
resource mobilization perspective, therefore, provides a useful link to broader social 
stratification issues and their relationship to social movements.  
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The political opportunity or political process framework has its roots in McAdam’s 
early work on the civil rights movement (1982)1. It emphasizes the role of context in 
shaping movement decisions and outcomes. Movement actors don’t make choices 
about the direction of the movement without considering environmental conditions. In 
the political opportunity framework, scholars focus on those conditions external to the 
movement that interact with the movements which “enhance or inhibit a social 
movement’s prospects for (a) mobilizing, (b) advancing particular claims rather than 
others, (c) cultivating some alliances rather than others, (d) affecting mainstream 
institutional politics and policy” (Meyer, 2004, p. 126). This framework was proposed in 
direct contrast to the resource mobilization framework, with its emphasis on 
organizations and the mobilization of resources. McAdam, alternatively, emphasized 
the importance of “expanding political opportunities, established organizations, and the 
social psychological process of ‘cognitive liberation’”. (McAdam, 2013, p. 1) The notion 
of “expanding political opportunities” has perhaps been the most impactful (Meyer and 
Staggenborg, 1996; Kitschelt, 1986; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; Meyer and Minkoff, 
2004). Put simply, it refers to emergent conditions of political regimes that leave them 
vulnerable to change from the outside, e.g. by social movements. McAdam also 
emphasized the ability of social movements to gain access to established 
                                                             
1 Though McAdam’s work builds on important early considerations of context such as those by Eisinger (1973) and 
Tilly (1978).  
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organizations—in this way complimenting the resource mobilization perspective—as a 
necessary but insufficient condition for mobilization. Importantly, McAdam argues that 
“cognitive liberation”, or the awareness of injustice and the ability to produce change 
through collective action is also a critical precondition for mobilization.  
Political opportunities can be viewed as both objective structural qualities of the 
political system (Kriesi, 1995; Kitschelt, 1986) and socially constructed (Noonan, 1995; 
Kurzman, 1996). Structural qualities are observable vulnerabilities in the political 
system that expose it to change; socially constructed political opportunities emphasize 
the agentic role of movement actors in creating and recognizing opportunities where 
none previously existed, particularly through discursive efforts (Ferree, 2003; 
McCammon et al., 2007). The subjective awareness of opportunities is critical, as 
objective opportunities may exist, but for them to lead to change, movement actors 
must be aware of them. However, there is disagreement over how deliberate movement 
actors are in seeking out and identifying opportunities (see Gamson and Meyer, 1996 
for discussion).  
Functionally, political opportunities can help scholars of social movements understand 
when mobilization and protest occur (Almeida and Stearns, 1998), how movements 
effect public policy (Amenta and Zylan, 1991), when movements crystalize into 
organizations and coalitions (Minkoff, 1995), and the emergence of specific strategies 
(Rochon and Meyer, 1997; Minkoff, 1997).  
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Finally, the framing perspective primarily addresses the role of what we can broadly 
refer to as the “cultural” aspects of social movements2. The framing perspective refers to 
“meaning work”, or “the struggle over the production of mobilizing and 
countermobilizing ideas and meanings.” (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 613) Movements 
need to articulate a message, and this message can be constructed from an array of 
choices. The message, with all of its symbolic, informational, and emotional contents is 
a frame, or what is often referred to as a collective action frame (CAF). Gamson and 
Modigliani (1989) refer to a frame as an “interpretive package”, or a bundling of 
information presented in a deliberate way that tends to be interpreted in a predictable 
way. Frames are not only a communicative object. In fact, Goffman’s work on frames 
referred to frames in thought, or a “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman, 1974). 
Goffman write that frames in thought “help in making an otherwise meaningless 
succession of events into something meaningful (Goffman, 1974, pg. 21). To make sense 
of our world, we use activated knowledge structures to filter information, incorporating 
it into our understanding of the world. A schema represents a top-down approach in 
cognitive psychology, with schemas representing broad forms of knowledge that 
provide meaning to smaller, component parts (Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Markus & 
                                                             
2 We return to the framing approach in the next chapter. There we engage in a “deep dive” into the concept by 
engaging with the social psychology of framing and its importance for understanding political polarization and 
social movements. Social movement scholarship has peculiarly failed to engage the much broader social 
psychological literature on framing, where the precise individual mechanisms through which framing occurs has 
received considerable attention. 
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Zajonc, 1985). A frame in thought can be thought of as a subjective theory of how some 
aspect of the world operates. They are not bound to a particular place or time, but 
represent a general understanding that can then be applied to a specific situation.  
Goffman (1974) argues that the primary import of frames in thought to a sociological 
understanding of the world is that they help us explain why people see the same 
“objective” situation in different ways. He argues that we have learned to interpret 
certain events in certain ways, focusing on some aspects of the situation and not others. 
This is what Goffman refers to as a “strip”, or “any arbitrary slice or cut from the stream 
of ongoing activity, including here sequences of happenings, real or fictive, as seen from 
the perspective of those subjectively involved in sustaining an interest in them.” (pg. 10) 
He further argues that frames in thought allow us to live by inference (Barsalou & Hale, 
1993). That is, we use our frames in thought to fill in the gaps of our cognitive 
interpretation of the environment. Goffman (1974) writes, “we can hardly glance at 
anything without applying a framework, thereby forming conjectures as to what 
occurred before and expectations as to what is likely to happen now.” (pg. 38) We live 
by inference because of the cognitive burden of applying a thorough analytical lens to 
every situation we find ourselves in. In other words, it would be impossible for us to 
systematically think through every aspect of every situation. We need to use frames in 
thought to provide a foundation of information. While frames in thought are highly 
useful, arguably necessary, cognitive tools, they can limit one’s scope of understanding. 
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Frames can be too rigid to integrate unusual or highly novel events or information 
(Wilensky, 1986). 
As it pertains to social movements, then, framing is the process through which social 
movements attempt to create resonance or alignment between their message and the 
message recipient’s understanding of the world (recipients need not be those outside of 
the movement; framing process are often rich observational opportunities within 
movements themselves—see Poletta, 2009). Framing is often done strategically, actively. 
It is a process with several functions and emerges from a variety of factors. The 
effectiveness of frames is in large part the product of discursive opportunity structures 
(McCammon, 2013; Koopmans and Statham, 1999). By latching onto dominant public 
logics, frames resonate with audiences, allowing movements to mobilize support, 
resources, or to change cultural knowledge.  
Frames emerge through three primary processes: discursive, strategic, and contested 
(Benford & Snow, 2000). Discursive processes refer to the “talk and conversations—the 
speech acts—and written communications of movement members that occur primarily 
in the context of, or in relation to, movement activities.” (pg. 623). Discursive processes 
involve two sub-processes: frame articulation and frame amplification. Frames are 
articulated by piecing together strips of reality, including public events, memories, and 
information, into a coherent story. Frames are then amplified by making salient 
particular issues, events, or beliefs that accentuate the frame. For instance, by 
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highlighting the latest police shooting, activists can amplify the relevance of their 
articulated frame. The event serves as a way to magnify the frame in the eyes of the 
public.  
Strategic processes involve the deliberate creation and application of a frame, typically 
with a pre-determined purpose. Strategic processes may be targeted to recruit new 
members, mobilize supporters, or to access new resources (Markowitz, 2009; Oliver and 
Johnston, 2000; Polletta and Kai Ho, 2006). Snow et al. (1986) identify four sub-processes 
that are utilized to achieve these ends: 1) frame bridging, or linking multiple previously 
unconnected frames targeted at a single issue; 2) frame amplification, or priming 
information that will increase the degree to which the frame resonates; 3) frame 
extension, or vertically expanding the scope of the frame to link with broader interests 
and concerns in the population; and 4) frame transformation, or by changing the 
understanding of a field-level frame to an alternative understanding.  
Contested processes occur between and within four entities: social movement actors, 
opponents, the media, and events themselves (Kaplan, 2008; Ryan, 1991). CAFs put 
forward by social movement actors can be challenged by opponents through counter 
framing efforts, relying on strategic development and application of frames. There can 
be considerable disagreement within and between social movement organizations over 
the meaning or use of a given frame. The media also plays a crucial role in framing 
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movements and their opponents, shaping the nature of the contest. Lastly, events 
themselves can contest a frame by changing the context in which it is applied.  
Frames have three purposes: to identify a problem and attribute responsibility, identify 
a solution, and to rally behavioral support for creating change (Snow & Benford, 1988). 
The most commonly referenced approach for identifying a problem is for social 
movement actors to engage an “injustice frame” (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 
1992). In this process, social movement actors identify a victim and increase awareness 
of the injustice affecting that victim. However, this is clearly not the only form of 
problem identification present in CAFs, and it may not be necessary in the case of some 
movements (Benford & Snow, 2000). CAFs may also attempt to attribute responsibility 
for the identified problem, though there can be considerable intra-movement 
disagreement over the cause of the problem (Benford, 1987). With a problem identified, 
a narrowed range of solutions to the problem are then available to social movement 
actors, who will advance their chosen solution through CAFs. Preferred solutions also 
differ between organizations engaged within a particular movement (Haines, 1996). 
Lastly, social movement actors must mobilize support for change, using CAFs to 
motivate the behaviors necessary for a preferred solution to work (Gamson, 1995). 
Benford (1993) identified four types of motivational frames: severity, urgency, efficacy, 
and propriety. Put differently, frames are “tools for strategic and creative behavior” 
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(Diehl and McFarland, 2010, p. 1719). In this way, framing is one element of the 
repertoire of contention available to movements. 
It is crucial to recognize that each of the three frameworks reviewed, while contributing 
greatly to our overall understanding of social movements, have been criticized, both 
explicitly in the emergence of the other (political opportunity of resource mobilization, 
and framing of both) and internally. For instance, the political opportunity perspective 
has been criticized as being too rationalist (McAdam, 2013) and for unclearly specifying 
major concepts both theoretically and operationally (Meyer, 2004) and for only partial 
empirical support (Goodwin and Jasper, 21999). As such, we take these frameworks as 
complimentary, and focus instead on the specific elements of their orientations that 
relate to perverse effects and political polarization. I will draw on these perspectives in 
the discussion where I explore the implications of a perverse effects typology for the 
broader field of social movement studies.  
Aside from these general frameworks, several other topics have received substantial 
attention in the social movements literature that require attention in our background 
check, as they will directly inform our own framework. The first is the body of 
scholarship on “repertoires of contention”, briefly mentioned earlier as the suite of 
tactics and frames that movements employ to achieve their goals. Tactics employed by 
movements include violence (Bosi, Demetriou, and Malthaner, 2014), hunger strikes 
(Scanlan, Cooper-Stoll, Lumm 2008), parades (McCammon, 2003), protest camps 
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(Feigenbaum, Frenzel, McCurdy, 2013), sit-ins (Morris, 1981), and a whole suite of 
emerging digital tactics to name just a few. Repertoires are critical for understanding 
movement outcomes, as research has shown they influence whether movements 
achieve their goals (King, Cornwall, and Dahlin, 2005).   
Of course, tactics and frames are not chosen at random. Classically speaking, tactical 
choices are made through a rational accounting process wherein movement actors 
weight the costs and benefits of a given tactic (McAdam, 1983). Complimentarily (see 
Taylor, Kimport, Van Dyke, and Andersen, 2009), others have emphasized that the costs 
and benefits of a given tactic are constrained by exogenous social conditions that 
require movements to fit their tactics to conditions they cannot control. That is, 
exogenous conditions constrain which tactics are likely to be effective, resonate 
(McCammon, Muse, Newman, and Terrell, 2007), or fit within cultural expectations of 
normative behavior (Tarrow, 1994). Tactical choice is also constrained by endogenous 
factors, such as what social movements know how to do (Tarrow, 1994). What is critical 
to understand about repertoires of contention is that they are not merely a grab-bag of 
tactics, but they are strategically chosen to fit a given end and a set of contextual factors. As we 
will review in our discussion of movement outcomes, tactics may have a direct role in 
shaping whether a movement succeeds or fails, but those tactics are informed by both 
internal movement characteristics and external conditions. For instance, frames are one 
element of a movement’s repertoire, but frames are only effective if they resonate with 
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what the target audience already believes and/or feels. Movements cannot simply 
engage any frame they want, but must tailor their message strategically to fit the pre-
existing perspective of the audience.  
Another area that has received substantial attention in movement scholarship is the role 
that the media plays in shaping movements and their outcomes. It is widely agreed that 
the media plays a strong mediating role in the relationship between movements and 
their targets (Lipsky, 1968; Barakso and Schaffner, 2006; Andrews and Caren, 2010). The 
media is vital to movements because they are a pathway to reach large audiences. 
Public demonstrations may be powerful, but if they reach only the small number of 
people who witness them in person, they are unlikely to have much influence. Thus, the 
media is an amplifying device for movement activities, and therefore are of central 
import to understanding effects on policy (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991) and public 
opinion (Vliegenthart, Oegema, and Klandermans, 2005), as well as movement diffusion 
(Andrews and Biggs, 2006). Koopmans (2004) goes so far as to say that direct interaction 
between movements and authorities are of little importance. Rather, he argues, 
movements and authority interact within the public sphere, the medium of which is the 
media (Oliver and Myers, 1999). Historically, movements involved direct engagement 
with authority (Tilly, 1986). But the growth of the modern nation-state and the 
technological revolutions that led to the emergence of a mass media have changed how 
protest happens. As Koopman (2004) notes: 
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“But nowadays protesters rarely get to see the addresses of their demands, 
nor do the latter directly observe, let alone engage, with the protesters. 
Bystander publics may still be present and occasionally they still cheer 
and boo, but it is no longer the co-present public that counts most, but the 
mass audience that sits at home and watches or reads the media coverage 
of the demonstration. In the context of mass electoral politics, the 
importance for both protestors and authorities of winning the sympathy 
of this audience has increased enormously. It is in the news media, 
moreover, that the most relevant part of the mutual observation and 
interaction between protesters and authorities takes place. Authorities will 
not react to – and will often not even know about – protests that are not 
reported in the media, and if they are reported, they will not react to the 
protests as they “really” were, but as they appeared in the media. If 
authorities find protests worthy of public response, that reaction is usually 
not communicated directly to the protesters by, say, calling up the 
organizers and expressing support for their cause, but by saying so in the 
media, and that message is usually not just addressed at the protesters 
and their sympathizers, but also at third parties such as political 
opponents and competitors, and last but not least at the elusive mass 
audience.” (p. 368).  
36 
 
The media serves several specific purposes. As identified by Gamson and Wolfsfeld 
(1993), the media assists movements in mobilizing, receiving validation, and expanding 
the scope of their claims. The media assists movements in reaching their broadest 
constituency, most of whom are non-participants and will only engage with the 
movement via media coverage of their actions and claims. The media also validates the 
movement by covering it; receiving media attention can show that the movement is a 
meaningful player in the policy or public sphere. Only when movements are validated 
are their concerns likely to be recognized and responded to by authority. The media 
also does a service to movements by linking their claims to broader cultural issues of 
actors. In doing so, the media expands the relevancy and resonance of the movement.  
The media are hardly “passive channels of communication or neutral and objective 
observers and recorders of events” (Oliver and Myers, 1999, p. 39). Editors and 
managers of media outlets must select which movements and protests to cover amidst a 
cacophony of claims, actions, and organizations shouting for public attention. 
Unsurprisingly, much attention has been paid to the factors that influence when the 
media covers a movement or protest, and the factors that increase the probability of a 
movement receiving media attention are too numerous to discuss in detail here. 
Generally, the relationship between the media and movements is the product of 
arrangements of resources, political context, the identities they invoke, the tactics they 
employ, and their degree of organization. For instance, preferences by journalists for 
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authoritative sources and information place loosely organized movement organizations 
at a disadvantage in gaining media attention (Tanner, 2004), though there are 
techniques movements can use to subvert this barrier (see Griffin and Dunwoody, 
1995). Highly organized and well-resourced organizations are better able to gain media 
attention though their ability to signal to journalists the newsworthiness of their actions 
(Elliot et al., 2016; Barker-Plummer, 2002; Staggenborg, 1988). “Insider tactics” are more 
likely to gain media attention (Andrews and Caren, 2010; Ryan et al., 2005; Schudson, 
2002; see Gitlin 1981 for an alternative view). Crises may also provide windows of 
opportunity for protests to increase movement coverage (Elliot et al., 2016; Molotch and 
Lester, 1975). In a recent synthetic empirical effort, Andrews and Caren (2010) find that 
the most critical factors in increasing media attention are higher levels of 
professionalization and routinization, the number of people the movement organization 
can mobilize, and the degree to which organizations tailor their claims to issues the 
media is already focused on. Elliot et al. (2016) note, importantly, that media coverage is 
largely determined by an interaction of both organizational and movement 
characteristics and exogenous contextual factors, similar to the political mediation 
model previously described (Amenta et al., 2010).  
A substantial body of research has been conducted on how news editors determine 
“newsworthiness”. As it relates to movements, left of center news organizations are 
more likely to cover movements and protests (Kriesi et al., 1995; Franzosi, 1987; Oliver 
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and Myers, 1999). Movements and protests that journalists can construct as being 
particularly dramatic, unusual, timely, and of great magnitude are more likely to 
receive coverage (Harcup and O’Neill, 2001; Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Shoemaker and 
Reese, 1991; Jacobs, 1996). The most critical and empirically supported newsworthiness 
criteria, however, is the scale of disruption caused by a movement or protest and its size 
(Andrews and Caren, 2010; Thornton and Shah, 1996; Oliver and Myers, 1999; 
McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith, 1996). Routine constraints in the process of publishing 
news also limits what gets covered, with journalists favoring movements that are easily 
packaged and templated (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991; Oliver and Myers, 1999). 
The picture painted thus far is that the flow of information and effects is 
unidirectional—from movements, through the media, to authority and the public. This 
is not a complete model (Koopmans, 2004). Movements also learn from the media’s 
coverage of the public and authority. Media coverage becomes a form of strategic 
information, allowing movements to adapt to a changing public sphere. Media coverage 
is a tool through which movements can learn about their constituencies and their 
opponents. Even if we assume that media coverage of movements and 
countermovements are biased and inaccurate (Gitlin, 1980; Ryan, 1991), the information 
that is provided still provides the basis of movement strategy.  
A conceptual framework: movements and social polarization 
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Having reviewed the social movements literature and identified key concepts and 
observations to be drawn in later, it is now useful and necessary to outline the 
conceptual framework I will use in the empirical section of this dissertation. This is 
perhaps unusually important in this case because no standard approach exists for the 
topic of this dissertation. Simply, no one has studied how social movements might drive 
social polarization or even how social movements intersect with partisanship. The very 
idea of social polarization is embryonic, with most research being published on the 
topic in the last two years. Even partisanship is a concept under persistent debate. 
What’s more, social movement studies themselves apply a wide range of theoretical 
approaches, operating from different methodological, epistemological, and conceptual 
assumptions. The goal here, then, is to find convergence between these concepts at an 
appropriate and useful level of abstraction.  
Where does research on social polarization overlap with social movement studies 
at the theoretical level? Does it overlap at all? Fortunately—as I will argue—it 
does. I build on the nearly five decades of research on social identity and 
intergroup conflict, beginning with the influential work of Henri Tafjel and John 
Turner (1979). The reasons for this are simple, though require some grounding. 
First, social movement scholars have used this theoretical approach to 
understand the conflicts that are central to the study of social movements and 
protest (see Klandermans, 2014 for a review). However, as Klandermans also 
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notes in his review, this approach is not necessarily consistent with other 
research on social movements that deploys the concept of identity. Research on 
“collective identity” often focuses on the shared characteristics of a group, and 
the way those characteristics influence mobilization or strategic decisions. In this 
study, I focus on social identity as a characteristic of an individual (see Turner, 
1982). Social identity in this sense is a recognition by a person that they belong to 
a group (e.g. political party). This view is consistent with recent work that has 
demonstrated powerfully the fact that political party identification is a forceful 
social identity (Mason 2015, 2018; Huddy 2001, 2013, 2018; Huddy, Mason, and 
Aaroe 2015; Margolis 2018; Achen and Bartels 2017; Greene, 1999; Iyengar et al. 
2018; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012).  
More importantly, however, social identity theory has from its outset been used 
to explain both intergroup conflict and intergroup attitudes, including 
discrimination and prejudice toward out groups respectively. If this sounds 
familiar, that’s good: prejudice and discrimination are the very essence of social 
polarization. Unsurprisingly, this is the theoretical approach used by Huddy, 
Mason, and their colleagues in developing an identity-based approach to 
partisanship and social polarization. The theoretical move required here, then, is 
to connect a social identity-based view of social polarization to a social identity-
based view of social movements and protest.  
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I contend that social movements act as vehicles for social identities that are often 
subsumed by or interact with partisan identities. As Mason (2018) notes, partisanship 
has become a sort of “mega-identity”, capturing numerous other social identities. This 
is true for identities such as feminism (Huddy and Willman, 2018), religion (Margolis, 
2018; Campbell et al., 2018), or race (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). But as Mason (2018) 
demonstrates, this can also include identification with a social movement. This is 
possible because today’s parties act as “broad umbrellas under which various 
constituencies—including mobilized social movement wings—co-exist in uneasy 
alliances.” (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010, p. 535) The climate change movement, the pro-
life and pro-choice movements, the Tea Party movement, the anti-fracking movement, 
the Black Lives Matter movement, the LGBTQ movement—each of these movements, 
amongst the most prominent in the U.S., are deeply partisan in their orientation. In 
2016, the Pew Research Center found that 64% of Democrats supported the Black Lives 
Matter movement, while only 20% of Republicans supported the movement. Pew data 
from 2017 on abortion is similar: 34% of Republicans believe that abortion should be 
legal in all or most cases, while 75% of Democrats share this view. The story is the same 
for climate change: 50% of Republicans believe that climate change is occurring, 
compared to 90% of Democrats (Borick, 2018). On climate change, the difference 
between partisans is a near consensus compared to a coin flip. 
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The relationship between social identity, partisanship, and social polarization is well 
demonstrated in empirical scholarship. The lesson is simple enough: the stronger a 
person’s partisan identity (or the more aware they are made of that identity), the more 
likely they are to discriminate against, evince prejudicial attitudes toward, and even 
dehumanize members of the outgroup, i.e. Democrats or Republicans (see Iyengar et al. 
2018 for review of research).3 Social identity theory suggests that merely identifying 
with a group is sufficient to create conflict. If we can identify ourselves as part of a 
group that is somehow distinct from another group, conflict can emerge. Conflict grows 
more severe when there is a competition for resources (broadly conceived), a perceived 
loss of status, or the perception of a zero-sum outcome. These conflicts result in out-
group prejudice and discrimination. Members of the groups begin to negatively 
stereotype the out-group, exaggerate the positive qualities of the in-group, and actively 
work to exclude, avoid, or harm the out-group, exacerbating group conflict. In other 
words: social polarization.  
                                                             
3 This hostility toward out-group members is referred to alternatively as affective (see Iyengar and colleagues) or 
social (see Mason and colleagues) polarization. Affective polarization refers, as Iyengar and Westwood (2015) 
describe, to “the tendency of people identifying as Republicans or Democrats to view opposing partisans negatively 
and copartisans positively.” (p. 691) Westwood et al. (2018) describe the presence of “warm feelings for the in 
group and correspondingly hostile evaluations of out groups” (p. 6). Social polarization, on the other hand, is a 
broader term that encapsulates a wider range of possible manifestations of intergroup polarization. However, given 
the cross-citation patterns in these respective areas, that both concepts rely on social identity theory, and their 
general conceptual overlap, we can proceed by simply treating the two terms as synonymous. Social polarization, 
then, is defined by Mason (2018) as “prejudice, anger, and activism on behalf of that prejudice and anger.” (p. 4) In 
this view, social polarization speaks to a sense of group-based animosity with both attitudinal and behavioral 
manifestations. Social polarization can be expressed through a wide range of actions.  I will use social polarization 
as my outcome variable, as I agree with Mason (2018) that it is a broader designation than affective polarization, 
which I view as one example of social polarization.  
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One mechanism that drives intergroup conflict, then, is identity threat. That is, when the 
status or resources of a group that an individual identifies with are threatened, existing 
group biases and hostilities become amplified. The mechanism of identity threat is 
useful for understanding how social movements drive social polarization. Social 
movements often explicitly challenge how society distributes resources among groups, 
especially when the movements are oriented to change policy (Amenta et al. 2010; 
Amenta et al., 2005; Amenta and Caren, 2004). This can create what social psychologists 
refer to as a “realistic threat” (Sherif, 1966; Tajfel and Turner, 1979), or a group-based 
threat that is based on instrumental concerns. Social movements engage in other 
activities that are likely to amplify group boundaries, including reducing group stigma, 
promoting positive identities, and increasing public awareness of group-based issues 
(See Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly, 1999 for discussion). While these activities do not 
directly challenge the distribution of resources between groups, they do challenge the 
superordinate status of outgroups by drawing attention to other (typically 
marginalized) groups and raising their status in society. This is an example of “status 
threat” (Outten et al., 2012; Craig and Richeson, 2014; Craig, Rucker, and Richeson, 
2018), which can operate in tandem or independent from realistic threat. 
Movements may also heighten social polarization through emotional pathways. When 
groups experience a threat, they are likely to experience a subsequently strong, negative 
emotion toward the outgroup, particularly anger (see Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 
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2000; Mason 2018). These negative emotions motivate behavior (Valentino et al. 2011; 
Van Zomeren, Spears, and Leach 2008; Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Banks 2016) and 
information seeking and processing (Albertson and Gadarian 2015). Negative emotions 
toward the outgroup are likely to be more severe when an individual’s social identities 
are well aligned (Mason, 2018; Roccas and Brewer 2002—see below for more detailed 
discussion of identity “sorting”).  
Aside from generating identity threat and emotional responses, social movements may 
heighten social polarization through mere priming. Research shows that simply being 
primed with an outgroup—consciously or unconsciously—influences individual 
attitudes and behavior (Rios, Ybarra, and Sanchez-Burks 2013; Paladino and Castelli 
2008; Cesario, Plaks, and Higgins, 2006; Jonas and Sassenberg 2006). When a strongly 
identified Republican sees news coverage of a climate change protest, they are 
reminded of their own ingroup by virtue of being exposed to the outgroup. Social 
movements prime partisan identities because, as I note above, many social movements 
are highly politicized and partisan. This connection can be made implicitly, but it can 
also be made explicitly if a movement focuses its energy on a particular politician or 
party. Merely being aware of the boundaries between groups can be sufficient to affect 
prejudice and discrimination toward an outgroup.  
So far I’ve outlined only a generic framework for how social movements can influence 
social polarization. But a critical question is how the variation in movements 
45 
 
themselves—not only their issues (which are conflated with partisanship itself), but also 
their strategic choices—overlaps with this underlying social identity framework. Put 
differently, amongst the litany of strategies that movements can deploy, which are 
likely to induce group threat? While an exhaustive description of how this might 
happen is beyond the scope of this study, I highlight a critical pathway that is central to 
the broader literature on social movements and protest: disruptive tactics. One of the 
dominant debates in movement research is over whether or not disruptive or violent 
tactics are more likely to achieve movement goals (see Giugni 1999). Much of this 
debate is rooted in the classic works of Gamson (1975) and Piven and Cloward (1979), 
who find that violent tactics are more successful than cooperative tactics. Importantly, 
violent tactics are hypothesized to produce success at least in part through threat—the 
disruption caused by a violent protest may cause a challenged authority to engage in 
some combination of repressive and conciliatory action to retain order (Mirowsky and 
Ross, 1981). This idea dates back to James Wilson (1961), who argued that the powerless 
have little to bargain with and thus must resort to disruption or violence to create 
something with which to bargain. Likewise, media attention is a vital factor for 
movement success (Koopmans, 2004; Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993), and the most 
critical and empirically supported newsworthiness criteria for a movement or protest is 
the scale of disruption it causes (Andrews and Caren, 2010; Thornton and Shah, 1996; 
Oliver and Myers, 1999; Hocke, 1998; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith, 1996). The most 
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disruptive of tactics are those that involve violence and property damage (McAdam and 
Su 2002), which is one way I operationalize disruption here.  
In social identity terms, disruptive and violent protest are likely to evoke the perception 
that a previously ineffective and weak outgroup are increasingly a threat to the group’s 
status, resources, or values, leading to greater negative emotions with subsequent 
effects on judgment and behavior (see Brewer 2010, p. 85 for discussion of threat and 
social change). This means that more disruptive protests will drive greater social polarization 
amongst partisan groups. Cooperative, peaceful demonstrations are less likely to evoke 
such a response. Social identity theory, then, provides us a blueprint for understanding 
how the actions of social movements interact with partisan identities to differentially 
contribute to social polarization.  
To conclude, I present the research questions that will be explored empirically. Each 
study (i.e. chapter) revolves around one of the following core research questions: 
Study #1, RQ1: Does exposure to protest increase social polarization? 
Study #2, RQ1: Does exposure to protest increase social dominance orientation? 
Study #3, RQ1: Does exposure to protest increase support? 
These questions reflect the general goals of this dissertation as outlined in the 
introduction. Study #1 examines whether and how movements influence social 
polarization. Study #2, addressing aforementioned concerns over how partisanship may 
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relate to democratic declines, examines whether and how movements influence support 
for authoritarian political leadership, operationalized in this instance by the construct of 
“social dominance orientation” (see study #2 for detailed discussion of this construct). 
Study #3 examines whether movements influence public support, with the goal of 
comparing the effects of protest types across the three outcomes studies here.  
Each of these research questions is developed through two additional research 
questions, focusing (1) on how different types of protest influence each outcome 
variable, and (2) on how partisanship conditions the effects of different types of protest 
on each outcome. These research questions are stated as such: 
Study #1: 
RQ2: Is effect of protest on social polarization conditioned by the type of protest? 
RQ3: Is the effect of protest on social polarization conditioned by the type of 
protest and partisan identity?  
Study #2: 
RQ2: Is the effect of protest on social dominance orientation conditioned by the type of 
protest? 
RQ3: Is the effect of protest on social dominance orientation conditioned by the type of 
protest and partisan identity?  
Study #3: 
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RQ2: Is the effect of protest on support conditioned by the type of protest? 
RQ3: Is the  effect of protest support conditioned by the type of protest and partisan 
identity?  
These additional research questions allow me to probe the core questions of this 
dissertation in an ordered and structured way. My goal is to evaluate how partisanship 
interacts with differentially threatening protest styles to influence social polarization, 
support for authoritarian leadership, and public support for the movement. I discuss 
the meaning of each question in the context of the separate studies within each chapter.  
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Methods 
The goal of this study is to examine the combinatorial effects of protest and 
partisanship, focusing on three outcomes: polarization, support for authoritarian 
political leadership, and movement support. In order to demonstrate these effects, I use 
an online vignette survey. Simply, respondents who participated in the study were 
tasked with (first) answering several background questions, (second), reading a mock 
news story about a protest, (third) answering a series of questions related to the 
outcomes of interest, and (fourth) answering standard demographic questions.  
This section walks through each of these sections of the survey in order while the next 
section discusses the data itself. However, several other design issues are worth 
addressing first. The base design involves a 3x2 design with three protest styles on the 
X-axis and two political positions on the Y-axis. The three protest styles are (1) violent, 
(2) non-violent but disruptive, and (3) non-violent and non-disruptive. As discussed in 
the literature review, these different types of protest represent a scale of “disruption”, 
with higher levels of disruption relating to greater perceived group threat. The two 
political positions are (1) supportive of policies to address climate change, or the 
“Democratic” position, and (2) opposed to policies that address climate change, or the 
“Republican” position.  
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There are two control conditions. Each of the conditions is used for one set of outcomes. 
The “movement outcomes” control condition is used in models with outcome variables 
related to support for the movement. The “polarization” outcomes control is used in 
models on polarization. The reason that two control groups are needed is because of the 
nature of the different outcome variables. The first two (social polarization and social 
dominance orientation) are best analyzed by comparing the effect of protest against a 
true baseline (i.e. someone who has not been primed with information about any 
movement at all). However, this is essentially impossible for the other outcome: 
movement support. By very definition, in order to understand how movement tactics 
influence movement support, questions about support must be tagged to a specific 
protest. This means that the other control group—the true baseline—can’t be used, 
because that control by design is not priming any movement-related information. The 
only potential conflict that might be caused by this choice is in the comparing the effects 
of the treatments on each of the outcomes. However, because I am only interested in the 
directional nature of the effects (e.g. if more disruptive protest increases/decreases 
social polarization and increases/decreases support), using a baseline control for social 
polarization and social dominance orientation and a minimal control for public support 
is unproblematic. The general framework for the vignettes is described in table 1.  
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Table 1. Experimental conditions 
 Violent 
protest 
Non-violent, 
disruptive protest 
Non-violent, non-
disruptive protest 
Control 
(movement 
outcomes) 
Control 
(polarization 
outcomes) 
Democratic-
leaning position 
1 2 3 
7 8 
Republican-
leaning position 
4 5 6 
 
At the beginning of the questionnaire, and prior to reading the vignette, respondents 
answer questions pertaining to their political leanings and their beliefs about climate 
change. A quota was used to ensure a given number of Republican (30%), Democrats 
(30%), and Independents (40%). Respondents who selected “Other” were removed from 
the survey immediately and did not proceed. The only other quota for this sample was 
gender, where the quota was roughly a 50/50 split. Following Q1, respondents were 
redirected to a follow-up question based on their answer. Democrats and Republicans 
were directed to one of two questions that asked them about the strength of their 
affiliation with their party, while independents were asked if they leaned Democrat, 
leaned Republican, or neither. Table 2 below describes the background and screener 
questions as well as the source for the survey items.  
Table 2. Background and screener questions 
Gender Source: U.S. Census 
 
Q1: What is your gender?  
A: Male, Female, Other 
 
Partisan 
identification 
Source: Party affiliation: National Election Survey 
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Q2. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a 
Republican, Democrat, an Independent, or something else? 
A: Republican, Democrat, Independent, Other 
 
Q3/Q4 (Republicans and Democrats only): Would you call yourself a 
strong Republican (Democrat) or a not very strong Republican 
(Democrat)  
A: Strong Republican (Strong Democrat), Weak Republican (Weak 
Democrat) 
 
Q5 (Independents only): Do you think of yourself as closer to the 
Republican party or the Democratic party?  
A: Republican party, Democratic party, Neither 
 
Q6: Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you 
thought much about this? 
A: Extremely liberal; Liberal; Slightly liberal; Moderate/Middle of the road; 
Slightly conservative, Conservative; Extremely conservative; Haven’t 
thought much about it 
 
Climate beliefs Source: Climate Change and the American Mind survey, 2018 
 
Q7: Recently, you may have noticed that climate change has been 
getting some attention in the news. Climate change refers to the idea 
that the world’s average temperature has been increasing over the 
past 150 years, may be increasing more in the future, and that the 
world’s climate may change as a result.  
 
What do you think: Do you think that climate change is happening? 
 
A: Yes, No 
 
Q8: How sure are you that climate change is happening? 
A: Extremely sure, very sure, somewhat sure, not at all sure 
 
Q9: Assuming that climate change is happening, do you think it is 
caused by… 
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A: Human activities; Natural changes in the environment; Both human 
activities and natural changes; Nothing, because global warming isn’t 
happening; Something not listed here 
 
 
Following the completion of background and screener questions, each respondent was 
tasked with reading only one of the vignettes or skipping the treatment (control), to 
which they are randomly assigned, making this a between-subjects design. In order to 
be able to derive unbiased causal estimates, subjects are assigned at random to one of 
the conditions (Charness, Gnezzy, and Kuhn, 2012). A between-subjects design assures 
that the order of the questions does not introduce issues of non-independence (Grice, 
1966; Auspurg and Jackle, 2015; Charness, Gnezzy, and Kuhn, 2012). All non-outcome 
measures are taken prior to treatment to avoid conditioning on posttreatment variables 
in subsequent analyses, particularly those involving multiple regression and interaction 
effects (Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres, 2018).  
Below is a table identifying the key elements of the vignettes, as well as how they 
are varied. The example below represents the Republican orientation with a 
violent protest, representing cell #4 from Table 1 above. The violent protest is the 
most disruptive of the three conditions. We build on the work of McAdam and 
Su (2002) to incorporate four elements of protest intensity, including violence by 
both police and demonstrators, property damage, and injuries.  
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Table 3. Vignette: Anti-climate change, high-hostility 
Vignette text Presence in vignette 
PROTESTORS, POLICE CLASH OVER CLIMATE CHANGE 
BILL 
 
Violent headline 
June 14, 2018 - Dozens of people remain in custody after a 
protest at the capitol building turned violent, police said. 
 
Around noon, thousands of protestors gathered at the capitol 
building for a planned demonstration. At approximately 1 
p.m., protesters began pushing back on police barricades that 
had been set up around the capitol building. In response, 
police began to use pepper spray to subdue protestors. Video 
from the scene shows protestors hitting and throwing objects 
at police officers. After nearly thirty minutes of physical 
confrontation, many protestors were arrested and the protest 
was broken up. Several protestors, as well as two police 
officers, were treated for injuries by paramedics.  
 
Photographs show extensive damage to several local 
businesses. One business owner told reporters that several 
thousand dollars’ worth of damage was done to his storefront 
by protestors. Footage also showed damage to public property, 
including several street lights and fencing around the capitol 
building. 
 
The city's police chief declined to offer details on what charges 
might be filled against protestors. 
 
Violent condition 
Prior to the outbreak of violence, several protestors told 
reporters that they showed up to oppose the state's efforts to 
address climate change, including a recently proposed bill 
from Congressman Turner that would immediately become 
the most aggressive state-level policy for addressing climate 
change in the United States. One protestor told reporters that 
“climate change is not caused by human actions, and we have 
real, important priorities to deal with in the state. We believe 
the state’s policy to address climate change is based on bad 
science and will hurt everyone in our state.” Protest organizers 
Republican 
orientation 
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pledged to continuing organizing public demonstrations until 
a vote takes place on Turner's bill.  
 
 
Non-disruptive headline: 
“PROTESTORS MARCH ON CAPITOL OVER CLIMATE CHANGE 
BILL” 
Non-disruptive description: 
“June 14, 2018 - On Thursday, thousands of protestors took to the streets 
as the state legislature prepares to vote on a climate change bill. 
At approximately 1 p.m., protestors began marching down Capitol Street. 
Protestors marched arm-in-arm, chanting demands and holding signs. 
The march lasted one hour and culminated at a nearby park. Following 
the march, several community leaders spoke to the crowd. Protestors also 
organized voter registration for participants and bystanders. Before 
dispersing, organizers informed their fellow protestors of future events 
and how to remain in touch with organizers. 
Police oversaw the protest and confirmed with reporters that the 
protestors cooperated with law enforcement throughout the day. The chief 
of police confirmed that the protest organizers had applied for and 
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received a permit two weeks earlier and he thanked them for remaining 
peaceful.” 
Disruptive, non-violent headline: 
“PROTESTORS DISRUPT CAPITOL OVER CLIMATE CHANGE BILL” 
Disruptive, non-violent description: 
“June 17, 2018 - Hundreds of protestors shut down the capitol building on 
Thursday over the state's efforts to address climate change.  
Around noon, thousands of protestors gathered at the capitol building for 
a planned demonstration. At approximately 1 p.m., protesters began 
entering the capitol building chanting demands and holding signs. 
Protestors refused to leave the building, which was largely paralyzed by 
the flood of protestors. Congressional staffers and administrators were 
unable to move around the building, as protestors filled hallways, lobbies, 
and offices. Many protestors took over congressional offices to demand an 
audience with elected officials. 
At 6:45 p.m., city police arrived to force protestors from the building. 
While many left under threat of arrest, hundreds stayed, tying themselves 
to banisters and even one another in order to make arrest difficult. As of 
Friday morning, police have yet to remove several dozen protestors, 
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though the chief of police told reporters on the scene that they would be 
cleared by the afternoon. The chief of police also noted that protestors 
were peaceful and respectful throughout the day and that no violence had 
come out of the day's events.” 
The third block is adjusted to include the following for the Democratic-leaning position: 
“Several protestors told reporters that they showed up to support the 
state's efforts to address climate change, including a recently proposed bill 
from Congressman Turner that would immediately become the most 
aggressive state-level policy for addressing climate change in the United 
States. One protestor told reporters that “climate change is caused by 
human actions, and it is a real and important priority that the state must 
deal with. We support the state's efforts to address climate change, 
especially Congressman Turner's bill.” Protest organizers pledged to 
continuing organizing public demonstrations until a vote takes place on 
Turner's bill.” 
As previously mentioned, there are two control conditions. The first (the 
movement outcomes control) involves a very brief bit of text prior to answering 
the questions on movement outcomes (see below) The other (the polarization 
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control) involves no text. Respondents simply skip the vignette section 
altogether:  
“There are a number of protest groups that support government efforts to 
reduce greenhouse gases and solve global climate change. 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements on these protest 
groups?” 
After reading the vignettes (or not, if assigned to one of the two controls), respondents 
then answer a series of questions that serve as outcome variables in my analyses. These 
variables, and the sources for the items (when available), are described in table 4 below. 
All questions with multiple items had the order of items randomized to limit order-
effects.  
The first set of variables measures support for the movement via five items (see table 4 
below for full description of post-treatment variables). The first is a simple 
support/opposition question, similar to what appears in a wide range of attitudinal 
survey work around climate change and energy. The next three items are non-standard 
and measure moral or sympathetic support for the organization they read about in the 
vignette. That is, these variables measure if the respondents identify with the 
organization and its cause. This is a crucial objective for social movements in interacting 
with the public. The final item measures willingness to behaviorally support the 
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movement by signing a petition. Respondents are told that they will be directed to the 
organization’s website following the survey to complete the task if they agree to it.  
While I describe the conceptual meaning of social polarization in the literature review, it 
is a new enough concept that some effort is needed to accurately describe how it is 
operationalized. Mason (2018) examines social distance, or our desire to avoid 
interpersonal interaction with members of the outgroup, as well as a “feeling 
thermometer” that gauges generic affect toward a group. Iyengar and Westwood (2015) 
look at job market discrimination in the form of interview callbacks. In this study, I use 
social distance and thermometer bias, building on the work of Mason (2018; 2015) and 
others (see Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Klar et al 2018 for examples). 
The social polarization measures used here are adapted from the approaches used by 
Mason (2018). The first is a “feeling thermometer”, itself adopted from the ANES. In 
this question, respondents are asked to rate the warmness (positivity) or coldness (or 
negativity) of their feelings toward eight individuals or groups associated with either 
the Republican or Democratic parties on a scale of 0-100. Higher scores (> 50) represent 
more positive feelings while lower scores (< 50) represent colder feelings. The second 
item represents a respondent’s willingness to be close friends with a Republican or 
Democratic voter. This is an adapted version of the social distance measure used by 
Mason (2018).  
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Finally, as a measure of tolerance for authoritarianism, I use a truncated version of the 
social dominance orientation measures developed by Sidanius et al. (1994), now widely 
used as measure of tolerance for authoritarian political leadership.  
Table 4. Outcome variables 
Movement 
support 
No source 
 
Q10: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements on the 
protestors you just read about? 
 
1) If they achieve their goals, people like me would be better off 
2) I share their beliefs and values 
3) They represent people like me 
4) I support the protestor’s cause 
 
A: Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither, somewhat disagree, strongly 
disagree 
 
Q11: Would you like to sign a petition in support of the protesters? If 
you select "yes", you will be directed to a petition from the group at 
the completion of the survey. 
 
A: Yes, no 
 
 
Polarization Source: Mason 2018/ANES  
 
Q12: Please read the name of the group or person listed on the left 
and rate that group or person using something we call the feeling 
thermometer. 
  
Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel 
favorable and warm toward the group/person. Ratings between 0 
degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward 
the group/person and that you don't care too much for that 
group/person. You would rate the group/person at the 50 degree 
mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the 
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group/person. If we come to a group or person whose name you 
don't recognize, you can rate that person at 50. 
 
A: Democratic party; Republican party, Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, 
The National Rifle Association (NRA), Planned Parenthood, The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement Agency (ICE), Democratic Voters, Republican Voters 
 
Q13: How willing are you to be close friends with someone who 
votes Democrat almost all of the time?  
 
A: I absolutely would, I probably would, Not sure, I probably would not, I 
absolutely would not 
 
Q14: How willing are you to be close friends with someone who 
votes Republican almost all of the time?  
 
A: I absolutely would, I probably would, Not sure, I probably would not, I 
absolutely would not 
 
Social 
dominance 
orientation 
Source: Sidanius et al., 1994 
 
Q15: Please describe whether you agree or disagree with the 
following statements 
 
1) Some groups of people are simply not the equals of others 
2) Some people are just more worthy than others 
3) This country would be better off if we cared less about how equal 
all people were 
4) To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others 
5) In an ideal world, all nations would be equal 
 
A: Strongly agree, agree, slightly agree, neither, slightly disagree, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 
Finally, respondents are asked several demographic questions based on items from the 
U.S. Census.  
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Table 5. Demographic questions 
Age Source: None 
 
Q16: In what year were you born?” 
 
A: Free response 
 
Age computed by subtracting year from 2018. 
Race Source: U.S. Census 
 
Q17: What is your race? 
 
A: White, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska 
Native, Asian (e.g. Chinese, Filipino, Korean, Vietnamese, Japanese, 
Indian, Pakistani), Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, Other 
Hispanic, Latino, 
or Spanish origin 
Source: U.S. Census 
 
Q18: Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? 
 
A: No, yes (Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano), yes (Puerto Rican), yes 
(Cuban), yes (Another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin) 
Education Source: U.S. Census 
 
Q19: What is the highest level of education you have received?  
 
A: Less than high school, high school graduate, some college, two-year degree, 
four-year degree, professional degree, doctorate.  
 
Gender Source: U.S. Census 
 
Q20: What is your gender? 
 
A: Male, female, other 
 
State Source: None 
 
Q21: Respondents select from drop down menu to the question “In 
what state do you live?” 
 
 
63 
 
At the completion of the survey, respondents were informed that the story they read 
was not true, and I describe to them the purposes of the study and why deception was 
necessary. The debriefing text read as follows:   
“Thank you for completing the survey! 
Before you sign off, I wanted to inform you that the topics addressed in 
the survey were fabricated. While there are many protests every year 
around the issue of the climate change, the protest described here was not 
actually based on a news story. Instead, it was constructed to represent 
critical features of protest that might influence how you think and feel 
about protest in general. Some of you read about one protest while others 
saw a different protest or none at all. 
Thank you again for participating in this survey.” 
After reading the debriefing section, respondents were thanked for their participation 
and exited the survey.  
Before concluding the methods section, it is worth pointing out the broader contribution 
of using experimental research in the study of social movements. Recent discussions 
within the social movements literature has argued that amongst other challenges facing 
studies of movements, particularly movement outcomes, is the issue of causal 
attribution (Giugni and Bosi 2012). Causal attribution is usually addressed in the social 
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sciences through time-series analyses and experimental designs. But, as was the case for 
McAdam and Su (2002), data quality makes time-series analyses for protest and social 
movements exceptionally challenging and open to statistical and analytical problems 
(i.e. relying on biases in protest coverage by newspapers). Regarding experiments, Bosi, 
Giugni, and Uba (2016) note that, to their knowledge, experimental research designs 
have never been implemented to evaluate the effect of social movement activities on 
policy outcomes. They go so far as to say that “the dilemma of causal attribution, 
finally, seems the most fundamental problem in this field of research.” (pg. 22) 
McAdam and Boudet (2012) note the problem of spuriousness in empirical work on 
movement outcomes, which can be difficult to address outside of experimental or 
quasi-experimental research designs. These authors also note that while a body of work 
on movement outcomes has begun to develop, “it is still relatively thin and plagued by 
a host of empirical problems that often make it difficult to reach any firm conclusion 
about the extent of a movement’s impact in any given case.” (pg. 99)  
Three recent studies in prominent sociology journals, however, use a similar approach 
to the one proposed here (Simpson, Willer, and Feinberg, 2018; Wouters and Walgrave 
2017; Bloemraad, Silva, and Voss 2016). While experimental studies may be far less 
effective in addressing a wide range of movement dynamics and outcomes, these three 
studies build on the established field of experimental studies on framing effects. The 
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experimental approach used in framing research allows these scholars (and myself) to 
examine how the public responds to a wide range of movement frames and tactics.  
By exposing a survey respondent to a different type of protest, we can compare the 
relative effects of those protests on the respondent’s self-reports of relevant perceptions. 
This, of course, does not apply to many of the outcomes of interest to social movement 
scholars (e.g. policy change), but it can be useful for understanding the subject of this 
dissertation: “public opinion”, broadly conceived. My approach here, then, is itself a 
contribution to the study of social movements in that I am furthering the effort to bring 
experimental research into the field in order to address persistent issues of causal 
attribution.  
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Data 
The survey has a total of 2,764 respondents. Three respondents dropped out after 
beginning the survey. This does not include the 229 respondents who selected “other” 
as their party affiliation and were screened out of the survey. Respondents were 
required to answer every question in order to complete the survey, meaning there is 
essentially no missing data in this dataset aside from the three individuals who did not 
complete the survey.  
The sample for this study is derived from Qualtrics, which relies on numerous online 
panels (with total number of participants in the millions) for generating samples. 
Qualtrics panels are generally quite representative of the U.S. population, but they are 
not a randomly selected national sample. All respondents are compensated for their 
time. Participants self-select into online panels that Qualtrics then draws upon to gather 
respondents. I discuss the “representativeness” of the sample below.  
The self-selection of participants into a paid labor pool of survey respondents raises 
questions over the data quality derived from of a convenience sample via 
crowdsourcing (Landers and Behrend, 2015). However, in studies across disciplines, the 
comparability of findings and respondent characteristics between convenience samples 
(including MTurk) generated samples and standard nationally representative samples 
(i.e. ISS, random-digit dialing) has found high levels of comparability between the two, 
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particularly along demographic characteristics (Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, and 
Freese, 2015; Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan, 2014). For instance, MTurk 
respondents exhibit similar classic heuristic biases and pay attention as well as in 
alternative sampling approaches (Paolacci et al., 2010). MTurk workers are also able to 
replicate laboratory findings of complex cognitive behavioral experiments (Crump, 
McDonnell, and Gureckis, 2013). Of most direct relevance for this study, convenience 
samples are also comparable to national samples in terms of partisanship, ideology, and 
political behavior, though there are small differences amongst older respondents (Huff 
and Tingley, 2015; Clifford, Jewell, and Waggoner, 2015). 
The data were collected between October 23 and November 1 of 2018. The survey took 
an average of seven minutes to complete following the procedure described in the 
previous section. In the table below two types of information are given regarding the 
demographic information of the sample. First, I report the percent of respondents in my 
sample who fit each category. Second, I compare this to the most recent American 
Community Survey estimates (2017). Generally, the sample looks similar to the U.S. 
population according to these four factors, though I do appear to have a more educated 
group than the national average.  
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Table 6. Comparison between sample and US population 
Variable Category Sample U.S. Population 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
Other 
50.3% 
49.1% 
0.6% 
50.8% 
49.2% 
N/A 
Age Average years old 41.8 37.9 
Race 
White 
Black 
Asian 
American Indian 
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
Other 
78.3% 
12.7% 
3.2% 
1.7% 
0.2% 
3.9% 
76.6% 
13.4% 
5.8% 
1.3% 
.2% 
2.7% 
Hispanic, 
Latino, 
Spanish 
origin 
Hispanic or Latino origin 
Not Hispanic or Latino Origin 
10.3% 
89.7% 
18% 
82% 
Education 
High school graduate or higher 
Bachelor’s degree or higher 
97.1% 
49.0% 
87.0% 
30.3% 
 
One potential problem with the data from this survey was that I had no control over 
whether respondents did in fact read the treatment conditions carefully. Rather than 
using an attention or manipulation check, which recent research suggests may be 
problematic (Hauser, Ellsworth, and Gonzalez 2018), I instead dropped respondents 
who spent less than 45 seconds reading the treatment. Using Qualtrics software, I 
observed how long each respondent spent on the page displaying the treatment. The 45 
second cutoff was chosen after several non-research participants allowed me to time 
how long it took to read each treatment. None of the participants completed the reading 
in under 45 seconds. Importantly, nearly 30% of respondents completed the task in 30-
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35 seconds, which is essentially impossible. It seems likely that respondents waited for 
the “proceed” button to appear on the webpage, which did not appear until 30 seconds 
after respondents entered the page but was necessary for the respondent to continue 
with the questionnaire. Ultimately, this resulted in between 126-148 respondents being 
dropped from each of the six treatments (no one was dropped from the control 
conditions as no time was required to complete the task). A total of 799 respondents 
were dropped, leaving 1,965 respondents. 
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Study one: Social movements, social identities, and social polarization 
In this first study I will address the most fundamental of my research questions: do 
social movements drive social polarization? While I will, of course, attempt to address 
this question dichotomously, I will also explore one mechanism through which it might 
occur. I previously argued that social movements can widen social polarization by 
producing perceived group (e.g. partisan) threat. While movements may do this in a 
variety of ways, I focus here on one: protest.  
One of the dominant debates in movement research is over whether or not disruptive or 
violent tactics are more likely to achieve movement goals than less disruptive tactics 
(see Giugni 1999). Much of this debate is rooted in the classic works of Gamson (1975) 
and Piven and Crawford (1979), who find that violent tactics are more successful than 
cooperative tactics. Importantly, violent tactics are hypothesized to produce success at 
least in part through threat—the disruption caused by a violent protest may cause a 
challenged authority to engage in some combination of repressive and conciliatory 
action to retain order (Mirowsky and Ross, 1981). This idea dates back to James Wilson 
(1961), who argued that the powerless have little to bargain with and thus must resort 
to disruption or violence to create something with which to bargain. Likewise, media 
attention is a vital factor for movement success (Koopmans, 2004; Gamson and 
Wolfsfeld, 1993), and the most critical and empirically supported newsworthiness 
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criteria for a movement or protest is the scale of disruption it causes (Andrews and 
Caren, 2010; Thornton and Shah, 1996; Oliver and Myers, 1999; Hocke, 1998; McCarthy, 
McPhail, and Smith, 1996). The most disruptive of tactics are those that involve violence 
and property damage (McAdam and Su 2002), which is how I operationalize disruption 
here.  
In social identity terms, disruptive and violent protest are likely to evoke the perception 
that a previously ineffective and weak outgroup are increasingly a threat to the group’s 
status, resources, or values, leading to greater negative emotions with subsequent 
effects on judgment and behavior (see Brewer 2010, p. 85 for discussion of threat and 
social change). This means that more disruptive protests will drive greater social polarization 
amongst partisan groups. Cooperative, peaceful demonstrations are less likely to evoke 
such a response. Social identity theory, then, provides us a blueprint for understanding 
how the actions of social movements (e.g. protest) interact with partisan identities to 
differentially contribute to social polarization. 
To summarize briefly, this chapter demonstrates the relative effects of (1) violent and 
disruptive protest, (2) non-violent but disruptive protest, and (3) non-violent, non-
disruptive protest, compared to (4) a control group where respondents did not read 
about any protest. These protest styles are interacted with partisanship in order to 
evaluate the combinatorial effect of protest and partisanship on social polarization. The 
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expectation is simple: the greater the partisanship and the greater the disruption, the 
greater the social polarization.  
In order to demonstrate the role that protest styles and partisanship play in widening 
social polarization, I will work through my analysis in three steps. The first step 
involves a simple analysis examining whether exposure to any protest widens social 
polarization, as stated by research question number one:  
RQ1: Does exposure to protest increase social polarization? 
The next step is to evaluate how protest types differ in their effects on social 
polarization.  I suspect that more disruptive, violent protest is more likely to increase 
social polarization than non-violent and non-disruptive protest. Thus, research question 
two: 
RQ2: Is effect of protest on social polarization conditioned by the type of protest? 
Finally, I’ve argued so far that protest style will interact with partisanship to widen 
social polarization. The effects of disruptive and violent protests on social polarization 
are more likely to occur for individuals who identify as partisan. That is, the effect 
should not exist or be much weaker for non-partisans. Thus, research question three: 
RQ3: Is the effect of protest on social polarization conditioned by the type of 
protest and partisan identity?  
Results 
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Before describing the results of my analysis, some notes on the variables used here, 
beginning with the two dependent variables. I use two measures of social polarization. 
The first is thermometer bias. Thermometer bias represents the distance between 
placement on a scale of 0 to 100. As described in the methods section, respondents are 
asked to place Democratic and Republican voters on a scale of 0 to 100 where 100 
represents positive, warm feelings and 0 represents negative, cold feelings. 
“Thermometer bias” is the absolute value of the distance between them, or the degree to 
which a respondent is socially polarized. This variable construction is in line with its 
use in other studies (Mason, 2018; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). 
Thermometer bias, as noted by Mason (2018), is but one way to evaluate social 
polarization. Thermometer bias captures affective polarization—the distance in 
emotional reactions to voters of the different party—better than it does an actual 
willingness to socially distance oneself regardless of how one feels. That is, we can 
examine a measure of social distance bias, or the willingness of persons to spend time 
with partisans and copartisans, respectively. All dependent variables are described in 
Table 4 in the methods section and are coded so that higher values represent greater 
polarization (thermometer bias) or greater unwillingness to be close friends with a 
partisan (social distance bias). 
What are the initial levels of the dependent variables used here? These are displayed in 
table 7. The thermometer bias measures are the absolute value of the distance between 
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the respondent’s ranking of Democratic voters and Republican voters on a scale of 0-
100. As would be expected based on the social identity framework used here, 
Independents exhibit a substantially lower thermometer bias value, on average, than 
either Democrats or Republicans. A small difference exists between Republicans and 
Democrats, with Democrats appearing to be more negative towards Republicans than 
vice versa. The social distance measures capture willingness to spend time with a 
partisan. The patterns, once again, are as expected. Republicans are the least likely 
(increasing value) to want to spend time with a Democrat and the most likely 
(decreasing value) to spend time with a Republican. The inverse is true for Democrats, 
while Independents in both cases are the median value.  
Table 7. Mean values for polarization measures 
 Thermometer bias Social distance, 
Democrat 
Social distance, 
Republican 
Pooled sample 40.84 1.74 1.83 
Republicans 47.33 1.86 1.39 
Independents 28.38 1.82 1.89 
Democrats 53.33 1.49 2.15 
 
Turning to the first analysis, depicted in table 8, all treatment conditions are collapsed 
into a single dummy variable. That is, the six treatments described in table 1 are 
collapsed into one treatment variable representing any person who was exposed to 
protest, with the other value representing respondents in the control condition. In table 
9, these treatments are disaggregated. In table 10, respondents are broken out by 
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partisan identification. That is, I run sub-analyses for each set of questions based on the 
respondent’s self-identification as either a Republican, Democrat, or Independent. The 
question wording is described in table 2, under “Q2.” 
The first analysis addresses the first research question, stated as: 
RQ1: Does exposure to protest increase social polarization? 
To address this question three regression models are used. The independent variable in 
each case is a dummy variable where all treatments are collapsed and coded as “1” (i.e., 
exposure to any protest) and the control group (no exposure) is coded as “0.” Three 
dependent variables are used: thermometer bias, social distance bias against Democratic 
voters, and social distance bias against Republican voters (i.e. stated willingness to 
spend time with a Democratic/Republican voter). For models of thermometer bias, 
ordinary least squares regression is used because the thermometer bias scales run from 
0-100. The social distance bias models use ordinal logistic regression, as the dependent 
variable is ordinal (1-5 scale). Results are presented in Table 8.  
Table 8. Regressions on thermometer and social distance bias (pooled treatment) 
 Model 1: 
Thermometer bias 
Model 2: Social 
distance, Democrat 
Model 3: Social 
distance, Republican 
 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Protest 4.00 (2.09)* 0.35 (0.12)** 0.18 (0.12) 
Constant 37.57 (1.88)** n/a n/a 
N =  1,569 1,569 1,569 
* p < .05; **p < .01 
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Clearly, exposure to protest increases social polarization. In model 1, we see that 
exposure to protest of any type increases thermometer bias by four percent.4 Likewise, 
exposure to protest also increases social distance bias against Democratic voters but not 
Republican voters. This suggests, as expected in research question three, that 
partisanship may condition the effects of protest on social polarization, perhaps 
asymmetrically (i.e. Republicans are more likely to dislike Democrats, but not vice 
versa).  
Yet, not all protest is created equal. As argued at length previously, we should expect 
different forms of protest to have different effects on social polarization. That is, more 
threatening protests (those that are violent or highly disruptive) to have less of an effect 
than less threatening protests (those that are neither disruptive nor violent), with the 
possibility of non-threatening protest having no effect at all. This was stated as research 
question two:  
RQ2: Is the effect of protest on social polarization conditioned by the type of protest? 
Table 9 below demonstrates the results of disaggregating the treatments and examining 
their effects separately. What we see is that a pattern begins to emerge around what 
types of protest are most likely to drive social polarization. Three out of six violent 
protests lead to greater social polarization; two out of six disruptive, non-violent 
                                                             
4 Because the dependent variable here is on a scale of 0-100, the incremental effect of treatment conditions 
on social polarization can be interpreted as percent change.  
77 
 
protests increase social polarization; and one type of non-violent, non-disruptive protest 
increases social polarization.  
Table 9. Regressions; thermometer and social distance bias (disaggregated treatments) 
 Model 1: 
Thermometer bias 
Model 2: Social 
distance Democrat 
Model 3: Social 
distance Republican 
 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Dem-Violent 2.26 (2.96) 0.44 (0.17)** 0.33 (0.17)* 
Rep-Violent 7.05 (2.91)* 0.24 (0.17) 0.08 (0.17) 
Dem-Disrupt 2.28 (2.93) 0.51 (0.17)** 0.37 (0.16)* 
Rep-Disrupt 3.63 (2.92) 0.21 (0.17) -0.01 (0.17) 
Dem-Cooperative 4.59 (2.98) 0.42 (0.17)** 0.24 (0.17) 
Rep-Cooperative 4.11 (2.99) 0.35 (0.17)* 0.11 (0.17) 
Constant 37.57 (1.88)** n/a n/a 
N =  1,569 1,569 1,569 
* p < .05; **p < .01 
All coefficients should be interpreted as the average difference between the treatment group and the reference 
condition (control group—see methods section for discussion of treatments and controls).  
 
As with the previous set of models, the effect once again appears asymmetrical, with 
social distance bias increasing for more protest types and in greater magnitude against 
Democratic voters, further suggesting the possibility that partisanship may be 
conditioning the effects of protest on social polarization. This was presupposed by 
research question three: 
RQ3: Is effect of protest on social polarization conditioned by the type of protest and 
partisan identity?  
In Table 10 below, I demonstrate results from a series of regressions on a measure of 
thermometer bias where both protest types and partisan identity are disaggregated.  
78 
 
When examining the effects of protest on Republicans only (model 2), we see that 
several types of protest increase social polarization. However, two of the three do not 
come from Democrat-oriented protest. Rather, the strongest effects are from the non-
disruptive and violent Republican-oriented protests, respectively. Respondents in the 
violent treatment condition exhibit levels of social polarization 15.59% higher than 
respondents in the control condition, while respondents in the non-violent, non-
disruptive treatment condition exhibit levels of social polarization 18.46% higher than 
those in the control condition. Likewise, Republican respondents who received the non-
disruptive Democrat-oriented position exhibit levels of social polarization 12.15% 
higher than the treatment group. That is, the distance between how positively 
Republicans rate Republican voters and how negatively they rate Democratic voters 
increases when Republicans observe several different types of protest.  
Democrats respond in line with expectations: Democrats who received the violent, 
Republican-oriented protest exhibit levels of social polarization that are 10.14% higher 
than the control condition, while respondents who received the non-violent, disruptive 
condition exhibit levels of social polarization 12.76% higher than the control condition. 
Democrats who received the non-disruptive condition exhibited signs of social 
polarization equal to the control group.  
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Table 10. OLS regression on thermometer bias with partisan affiliations 
 Model 1:  
Republicans only 
Model 2: 
Independents only 
Model 3:  
Democrats only 
 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Dem-Violent 5.06 (5.90) -1.06 (3.96) 4.37 (5.11) 
Rep-Violent 15.59 (5.51)** 0.99 (3.86) 10.14 (5.30)* 
Dem-Disrupt 8.58 (5.72) -3.43 (3.96) 3.89 (5.05) 
Rep-Disrupt 5.11 (5.32) -3.70 (3.99) 12.76 (5.30)* 
Dem-Cooperative 12.15 (5.69)* 1.37 (3.85) 7.41 (5.64) 
Rep-Cooperative 18.46 (5.90)** -1.98 (3.80) 8.24 (5.67) 
Constant 38.76 (3.49)** 29.49 (2.57)** 47.11 (3.36)** 
N =  436 680 453 
* p < .05; **p < .01 
All coefficients should be interpreted as the average difference between the treatment group and the reference 
condition (control group—see methods section for discussion of treatments and controls).  
 
Tables 11 and 12 demonstrate the effects of protest on social distance bias with the same 
three partisan categories. The dependent variable in this case is a willingness to be close 
friends with someone who votes for either the Democratic or Republican party most of 
time, as described in table 4 in the methods section.  
Several things become clear from this analysis. The pooled-sample models in Tables 8 
and 9 indicate that protests increase social distance bias (values are coded such that 
higher values represent a greater unwillingness to be close friends with a Democratic or 
Republican voter) for both Democratic and Republican voters. However, when I 
segment the analysis out by party (tables 11 and 12), it becomes clear that the effects in 
the pooled-sample models are driven almost entirely by self-identified Republicans. In 
both Republican only models (models 2 in both tables), we see that Republicans who 
are exposed to violent or disruptive protests express greater unwillingness to spend 
time with Democrats. Surprisingly, exposure to non-disruptive forms of Republican-
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oriented protest also increase social distance bias amongst Republicans. No effects 
emerge for Democrats and, as expected, Independents.  
Table 11. Ordinal logistic regression on willingness to be friends with Democratic voter 
 Model 1:  
Republicans only 
Model 2: 
Independents only 
Model 3:  
Democrats only 
 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Dem-Violent 0.81 (0.33)** 0.42 (0.27) 0.13 (0.32) 
Rep-Violent 0.57 (0.31) -0.24 (0.26) 0.56 (0.33) 
Dem-Disrupt 0.94 (0.32)** 0.44 (0.26) 0.18 (0.32) 
Rep-Disrupt 0.54 (0.30) 0.04 (0.26) -0.01 (0.34) 
Dem-Cooperative 0.37 (0.32) 0.43 (0.26) 0.27 (0.34) 
Rep-Cooperative 0.65 (0.32)* 0.32 (0.25) -0.31 (0.37) 
N =  436 680 453 
* p < .05; **p < .01 
All coefficients should be interpreted as the average difference between the treatment group and the reference 
condition (control group—see methods section for discussion of treatments and controls).  
 
Shifting attention to willingness to be friends with Republican voters, we find a similar 
pattern. Once again, this effect appears to be driven by Republicans. In this case, 
however, that effect is surprising. Based on the identity-framework used here, we 
would expect that, if anything, Republicans would be more likely to want to be friends 
with a Republican voter. Instead, they appear to be less willing, not only when exposed 
to Democratic-oriented protest, but also violent Republican-oriented protest. 
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Table 12. Ordinal logistic regression on willingness to be friends with Republican voter 
 Model 1:  
Republicans only 
Model 2: 
Independents only 
Model 3: 
Democrats only 
 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Dem-Violent 0.87 (0.37)* 0.16 (0.26) 0.09 (0.29) 
Rep-Violent 0.77 (0.35)* -0.45 (0.25) 0.36 (0.29) 
Dem-Disrupt 0.76 (0.37)* 0.09 (0.26) 0.28 (0.28) 
Rep-Disrupt 0.42 (0.35) -0.35 (0.26) 0.21 (0.30) 
Dem-Cooperative 0.78 (0.36)* 0.07 (0.24) 0.06 (0.31) 
Rep-Cooperative 0.50 (0.38) 0.05 (0.24) -0.27 (0.32) 
N =  436 680 453 
* p < .05; **p < .01 
All coefficients should be interpreted as the average difference between the treatment group and the reference 
condition (control group—see methods section for discussion of treatments and controls).  
 
Discussion 
The results of this chapter have a clear message: protest drives social polarization. But it 
appears to do so for different reasons, and in different patterns, then expected. 
What is critical to take from the analysis presented here is that the effects are bipartisan 
in their presence yet asymmetrical in their extent. Consistent with other research (see 
Grossman and Hopkins, 2018 for broad discussion), Republicans appear to be 
substantially more susceptible to social polarization. Democrats are no less willing to 
spend time with a Republican voter regardless of their exposure to protest. Republicans, 
on the other hand, are less likely to want to spend time with a Democratic voter and 
exhibit higher levels of thermometer bias.  
However, the pattern of significant effects suggests something surprising. Rather than 
being driven purely by ingroup and outgroup dynamics, the effect appears to be 
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driven, at least in part, by a general distaste for protest. Protest appears to drive social 
polarization because people simply do not like politics, as suggested in recent work by 
Klar et al (2018). While I cannot directly test a mechanism for this, one explanation that 
would be consistent with this pattern, as argued by Klar et al (2018) and others, is that 
Americans are simply tired of politics and do not wish to engage in unpleasant debates 
with people whom they disagree. This is particularly apparent in the examination of 
variation in willingness to spend time with partisans and copartisans after reading 
about a protest. Republicans are not only disinclined to want to be friends with 
Democratic voters after observing a protest, but also Republican voters.  
Effects simply do not exist for self-identified Independents. This is predictable: 
Independents have little allegiance to a given party, may find political debates less 
disagreeable, and as predicted by the identity framework deployed here, are not 
inclined to become more polarized based on exposure to a partisan protest.  
Of course, the treatments used in this study lack the ecological validity that one might 
hope for. Future research should examine how intensity of exposure to protest 
influences social polarization. I suspect that individuals come to exposure of protest in 
much more powerful ways, either through repeated or detailed exposure (lengthier 
articles or daily news coverage of an ongoing protest), through heavily editorialized 
coverage (e.g. Fox or MSNBC news), and with far more visceral coverage, involving 
images and video of the protest. That these admittedly weak treatments yield any 
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impact at all is a sign that genuine news coverage is likely to elicit much greater effects. 
As Koopmans (2004) reminds us, the media is the primary conduit through which the 
vast majority of movement bystanders experience protest and social movement activity. 
While this study mimics media exposure to protest by design, we do not capture the 
true ecological experience of media exposure to protest for the reasons listed above. In 
an era of partisan news coverage, I suspect that the effects identified here are 
compounded and amplified by news room that selectively present protest behavior.  
One broad interpretation of this study is that partisanship is part of what movement 
scholars describe as the political opportunity structure (McAdam 1982). The political 
opportunity or political process framework emphasizes the role of context in shaping 
movement decisions and outcomes. In the political opportunity framework, scholars 
focus on those conditions external to the movement that interact with the movements 
which “enhance or inhibit a social movement’s prospects for (a) mobilizing, (b) 
advancing particular claims rather than others, (c) cultivating some alliances rather than 
others, (d) affecting mainstream institutional politics and policy” (Meyer, 2004, p. 126). 
The framework in particular focuses on the notion of “expanding political 
opportunities” (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996; Kitschelt, 1986; Goodwin and Jasper, 
1999; Meyer and Minkoff, 2004), or the emergent conditions of political regimes that 
leave them vulnerable to change from the outside, e.g. by social movements. 
Functionally, political opportunities can help scholars of social movements understand 
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when mobilization and protest occur (Almeida and Stearns, 1998), how movements 
effect public policy (Amenta and Zylan, 1991), when movements crystalize into 
organizations and coalitions (Minkoff, 1995), and the emergence of specific strategies 
(Rochon and Meyer, 1997; Minkoff, 1997).  
It’s hardly a leap to suggest that partisanship is one part of the broader political 
opportunity structure. In times when hyper-partisanship reigns, as is the case today, 
this critical contextual factor will both shape the effects of movements (e.g. social 
polarization, but also public support—see chapter three) and which strategies are likely 
to be most successful (e.g. violent, disruptive, or cooperative tactics). This is one way 
through which movement scholars may begin to think about partisanship at an 
appropriate level of abstraction. By interrogating partisanship as a political condition 
through which movements must navigate, we can better understand its role in shaping 
movements and their effects.  
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Study two: Movements, polarization, and democracy 
Social polarization is hypothesized to contribute to declines in democratic norms and 
attitudes (see Mason 2018; Iyengar et al 2018). That is, as partisan groups become 
increasingly hostile toward one another, it is possible that they become increasingly 
willing to support a political system or party leaders who take extreme measures to 
protect the ingroup. This can become authoritarianism when it involves violating the 
rights of outgroups (e.g. “fake news” and the “enemy of the people”). This is arguably a 
deeper form of social polarization: being willing to support political actions that violate 
systemic norms of fairness and mutual tolerance are extreme forms of social distancing. 
Likewise, declines in mutual tolerance and support for the rights of outgroups are early 
indicators of democratic decline and the rise of authoritarian political leadership 
(Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). That is, if social movements deepen social polarization, they 
may also be strengthening support for authoritarianism. Thus, my second chapter 
examines if and how social movements produce this deleterious spillover effect.   
The relationship between social movements and support for authoritarianism are 
predictable according to social dominance theory, which builds on work on realistic 
threat and social identity discussed previously. Social dominance theory is concerned 
with group-based hierarchy and the processes that maintain such hierarchies. This 
includes institutional forces, i.e. the use of official state power. According to social 
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dominance theory, group-based discrimination occurs because group-based identities 
and ideologies “coordinate the actions of institutions and individuals… [and] as such, 
people support institutions that allocate resources in accordance with those ideologies 
[Mitchell and Sidanius, 1995; Pratto, Stallworth, and Conway-Lanz 1998; Pratto, 
Stallworth, and Sidanius, 1997] (Sidanius et al 1994, p. 847). This is driven by social 
dominance orientation (social dominance orientation), a psychological orientation 
toward group dominance. Research in social dominance theory has shown that social 
dominance orientation moderates the effect of group conflict on discriminatory 
behavior (e.g. social polarization).  
“For example, in a minimal-groups experiment, we found that people 
higher in social dominance orientation were most discriminatory against 
the out-group when the ingroup was one with which they could highly 
identify (Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994). In implicit group 
discrimination experiments, people high and low in social dominance 
orientation appeared equally discriminatory until they were put under 
group threat, at which point high-social dominance orientation people 
became highly discriminatory and low-social dominance orientation 
people failed to discriminate (Pratto & Shih, 2000). Independently, Jackson 
and Esses (2000) have shown that reducing perceptions of the group 
threat posed by immigrants reduces prejudice against them by those low 
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in social dominance orientation, but that this intervention does not work 
for those high in social dominance orientation.” (Sidanius et al 1994, p. 
850)  
Support for authoritarian political leadership, then, may be a manifestation of support 
for a specific group-based hierarchy. A willingness to suppress the rights of the 
outgroup for the purposes of protecting the ingroup is a logical extension of the identity 
threat dynamics previously described. When a group is threatened, members’ 
heightened prejudice and negative emotions toward the outgroup increase the 
likelihood that they will believe that the outgroup is undeserving of equality under the 
law and to believe an authority is needed to protect the ingroup from the encroaching 
threat of the outgroup. This will occur even if it requires the violation of norms of 
mutual tolerance that a democracy relies on (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). In more 
extreme cases, when outgroup hostility becomes dehumanizing, groups are more likely 
to endorse outright violence against the outgroup (Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, Cotterill 
2015).  
In the case of social movements and partisanship, I suspect that exposure to threatening 
social movement tactics not only increases social polarization amongst partisans, but 
has the additional effect of increasing support for generic authoritarian political 
leadership amongst those same partisans. Partisans will express greater support for 
authoritarian political leadership because they will be more likely to perceive the 
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outgroup (the movement and its associated partisan affiliation) as representing a threat 
to their ingroup. Importantly, this is a case where the effects of social movement tactics 
may be asymmetrical. I suspect that the effect of high-threat tactics will be greater for 
Republicans than Democrats in this instance, given evidence of higher levels of social 
dominance orientations amongst conservatives (Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 
1999; Van Hiel and Mervielde 2006).  
Given aforementioned research on the central role of social dominance orientation in 
influencing discriminatory outgroup behavior, I focus here on how protest increases or 
decreases social dominance orientation. My assumption is that if protest increases social 
dominance orientation, it will therefore also increase outgroup discriminatory behavior 
and support for other such authoritarian political action, though I am not able to test 
those outcomes directly.   
Understanding the effects of social movements on tolerance for anti-democratic norms 
has potentially serious implications. If movements exhibit either direct and/or indirect 
effects on support for authoritarian political behavior due to partisan group dynamics, 
it would point toward a much deeper meaning of McAdam and Kloos’ (2014) notion of 
movements as centrifugal forces. If this were to be observed, movements may in fact 
hasten the demise of, rather than preserve, democratic institutions and norms, driven 
largely by the force of mass partisanship.  
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Thus, I have my next set of research questions, following the structure of the first 
analysis wherein I identify a basic effect, and add dimensionality with types of protest 
and partisanship, respectively:  
RQ1: Does exposure to protest increase social dominance orientation? 
RQ2: Is the effect of protest on social dominance orientation conditioned by the type of 
protest? 
RQ3: Is the effect of protest on social dominance orientation conditioned by the type of 
protest and partisan identity?  
Results 
The dependent variable in this analysis is a composite measure of social dominance 
orientation, based on the items described in the methods section (alpha = .84) and 
detailed in table 13 below.  
Table 13. Social dominance orientation items 
Please describe whether you agree or disagree with the following statements 
 
1) Some groups of people are simply not the equals of others 
2) Some people are just more worthy than others 
3) This country would be better off if we cared less about how equal all people were 
4) To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others 
5) In an ideal world, all nations would be equal 
 
A: Strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, neither, slightly agree, agree, strongly agree 
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Table 14 shows the levels of social dominance orientation between different segments of 
the sample. As expected, Republicans exhibit the highest levels (agreement) of social 
dominance orientation. Democrats and Independents are essentially equivalent.  
Table 14. Mean values for social dominance orientation 
 Social dominance orientation 
Pooled sample 3.41 
Republicans 4.23 
Independents 3.09 
Democrats 3.10 
 
As with the previous study, the first analysis here uses a pooled treatment dummy 
variable for the independent variable in order to evaluate the generic effect of protest on 
social dominance orientation. This model allows us to address research question one: 
RQ1: Does exposure to protest increase social dominance orientation? 
The results of this analysis are presented in table 15 below. Surprisingly—
confoundingly, really—the general effect of protest on social dominance orientation is 
negative. That is, respondents who were exposed to protest exhibit a lower social 
dominance orientation than those who were not exposed to a protest. Needless to say, 
this runs counter to expectation. However, further analysis is needed to better 
understand why this effect may be occurring. 
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Table 15. OLS regression on social dominance orientation (pooled treatment) 
 B (SE) 
Protest -0.51 (0.11)** 
Constant 3.78 (0.09)** 
N =  1,569 
* p < .05; **p < .01 
 
Another way to evaluate the effects is to see if any particular type of protest is driving 
the effect over others. It may be that the direction of the effects differ, and that perhaps 
cooperative protest lowers social dominance orientation more so than violent and 
disruptive protest, making a pooled sample appear to move in a negative direction. 
Thus, research question two: 
RQ2: Is the effect of protest on social dominance orientation conditioned by the type of 
protest? 
To address research question two, I disaggregate the protests into the six treatments 
described in the first study with a control reference condition. Again, quite contrary to 
expectation, the effects are all negative. Likewise, the magnitude of the effect is fairly 
consistent. For each type of protest, exposure to a protest lowers social dominance 
orientation compared to a control group. The effects are highly significant in each case.  
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Table 16. OLS regression on social dominance orientation (disaggregated treatments) 
 B (SE) 
Dem-Violent -0.43 (0.15)** 
Rep-Violent -0.45 (0.15)** 
Dem-Disrupt -0.56 (0.15)** 
Rep-Disrupt -0.59 (0.15)** 
Dem-Cooperative -0.51 (0.15)** 
Rep-Cooperative -0.50 (0.15)** 
Constant 3.78 (0.99)** 
N =  1,569 
* p < .05; **p < .01 
 
It is worth noting here for the reader that considerable care was taken to evaluate the 
coding of the social dominance orientation variable. I ensured that the survey 
instrument was producing properly coded responses, that all syntax transformed the 
variables appropriately, and that the coding of the final composite variable was 
computed accurately.  
But perhaps the effect is not surprising after all. According to the social identity theory 
framework used here, we should expect social dominance orientation to increase when 
a group is under threat. However, the only way to properly evaluate the effects of 
protest on social dominance orientation is to capture ingroup and outgroup dynamics. 
A pooled treatment or a disaggregated set of treatments are essentially meaningless if 
not disaggregated further—protest should only be threatening when the protest comes 
from an outgroup, i.e. a Republican seeing a protest from a group aligned with 
Democrats. Disaggregation of the treatments must be paired with a segmented analysis 
by partisanship. Thus, we must address research question three: 
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RQ3: Is the effect of protest on social dominance orientation conditioned by the type of 
protest and partisan identity?  
The results of this analysis are demonstrated in table 17, which begins to make some 
sense of the negative effects. The effects of protest on social dominance orientation are 
almost entirely isolated to Republicans. That is, with only the exception of the violent, 
Democratic-oriented protest, each treatment has the effect of lowering social dominance 
orientation in comparison to the control group. Effects are also apparent for the violent 
and non-violent disruptive Republican-oriented treatments for Independents, though 
the magnitude of the effect is substantially smaller. The greatest effects for lowering 
social dominance orientation are from cooperative protest.  
Table 17. OLS regression on social dominance orientation with partisan affiliations 
 Model 2: 
Republicans only 
Model 3: 
Independents only 
Model 4: 
Democrats only 
 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Dem-Violent -0.56 (0.31) -0.35 (0.20) -0.16 (0.28) 
Rep-Violent -0.74 (0.30)** -0.41 (0.20)* -0.08 (0.29) 
Dem-Disrupt -0.80 (0.30)** -0.28 (0.20) -0.49 (0.28) 
Rep-Disrupt -0.76 (0.29)** -0.68 (0.20)** -0.39 (0.29) 
Dem-Cooperative -1.16 (0.30)** -0.26 (0.19) -0.12 (0.31) 
Rep-Cooperative -0.90 (0.31)** -0.24 (0.19) -0.33 (0.31) 
Constant 4.83 (0.31)** 3.37 (0.13)** 3.24 (0.18)** 
N =  436 680 453 
* p < .05; **p < .01 
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Discussion 
The results of this analysis are surprising to say the least. It is difficult to offer a clear 
explanation for why Republicans social dominance orientation is reduced through 
exposure to protest, though I am confident that the effect is real. As such, I will be 
cautious in interpreting these findings. 
The most obvious way to interpret the findings in this study is to take them at face 
value. When Republicans are exposed to protest they become less inclined to support 
social hierarchies and inequality. This implies that protest is a clear democratic good: 
protest has the useful effect of promoting social egalitarianism. Above and beyond the 
effects of protest on support for a given cause, they have the secondary benefit of 
promoting a more egalitarian society.  
I conducted several secondary analyses to try to understand what might be going on 
with these findings, i.e. what mechanisms might explain the observed effect. One 
hypothesis is that, while we might assume all Republicans would find an anti-climate 
change protest representative of an outgroup, it may be that many Republicans believe 
in climate change and perceive the protest as representative of their own beliefs. Indeed, 
about 20% of Republicans in this sample do believe in anthropogenic climate change. 
Some Republicans may therefore be buoyed by seeing such protests, accounting for all 
of the observed effect. Of course, this would fail to explain why no such effect exists for 
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Democrats or why exposure to Republican-oriented climate change protest also exhibits 
a negative effect. In fact, using this dichotomous variable as a control does not weaken 
the effect amongst Republicans.  
Alternatively, it may be that because Republicans exhibit higher levels of social 
dominance orientation in general—both within this sample and consistent with prior 
research on social dominance orientation—that the effects of protest on lowering social 
dominance orientation is not dependent on party identification. Rather, Democrats’ pre-
existing levels of social dominance orientation are so low that it is difficult for 
treatments such as these to lower them further. On the contrary, because Republicans 
have higher levels of social dominance orientation, it has more elasticity, allowing these 
treatments to produce an effect. 
Regardless of how future research might be able to explain these findings—or what 
factors they are conditioned upon—it does appear that we can conclude that protest, 
whether agreeable or not, has the effect of lowering social dominance orientation 
amongst the group of Americans who exhibit the greatest levels of it. This is critical. As 
reviewed earlier, social dominance orientation is linked to support for authoritarianism 
and tolerance of social inequality. By protesting, activists may, contrary to much 
expectation, be generating the exact opposite of a backlash. Instead, they are promoting 
underlying values of democracy, equality, and tolerance, regardless of the specific 
content of the protest.  
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If taken at face value, a second implication is that it is non-violent, non-disruptive 
protest that most decreases social dominance orientation amongst Republicans. This is 
another sign, in line with the preceding and ensuing analyses, that non-violent, non-
disruptive protest is preferable to the alternatives. Not only—as I will show in the next 
analyses—does it have the most positive effect on support, but it also is the least likely 
to increase social polarization (and with the smallest magnitude) and has the secondary 
benefit of lowering social dominance orientation amongst a group with high, pre-
existing levels.  
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Study three: Protest, partisanship, and public opinion 
Obviously, movements do not use protest for the purposes of polarizing the public 
along partisan lines. They do so for a variety of reasons well-articulated by social 
movement scholars and partially reviewed earlier. There is a long-standing debate, 
however, about the best means through which to achieve these goals. This debate 
between the efficacy of cooperative, disruptive, and violent protest styles has been 
addressed repeatedly to this point, but a brief review is worthwhile here.  
The classic argument for violence—and disruption more generally—is that by creating 
social unrest, disenfranchised and marginalized groups are able to create something 
with which to bargain (Piven and Crawford, 1979). Elites will bargain with the 
protesting group to restore order. Disruptive and violent protest have the additional 
value of generating media attention, which assists in gaining and changing public 
opinion (Rochon 1998; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Andrews, Beyerlein, and Farnum 
2015) which is a condition for movement success (see Angone, 2007; Burstein and 
Linton, 2002; Burstein and Freudenburg, 1978).  
Specific to violent protest, Turner (1970) hypothesizes that protest that is viewed as 
threatening (e.g. violence) is less likely to be viewed as credible protest at all, 
diminishing support from the public. However, other empirical work suggests the 
opposite. McAdam and Su (2002) find that, rather than movements generating a generic 
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effect on public opinion, it is violent protest that shifts public opinion toward 
movement objectives, though it may be associated with a backlash against the 
movement itself. In an experiment similar to the one used here, Thomas and Louis 
(2014) find that violent protest undermines bystander support, while non-violent 
protest is more effective. Though research that directly targets the effect of violent 
protest on public opinion is limited, Kalmoe (2017) finds that aggressive metaphors 
motivate voters who are inclined toward aggression but demobilize others. What’s 
more, Kalmoe, Gubler, and Wood (2017) find a similar pattern for partisan polarization. 
Simpson, Willer, and Feinberg (2018) find that violent protest tactics tend to lower 
support for a protest. Overall, research on the relationship between protest styles and 
public opinion is ambivalent.  
Perhaps contributing to this ambivalence is that none of these studies evaluate the role 
that partisanship plays in moderating the effect of violent protest on public opinion. In 
an interesting corollary to this study, Bloemraad, Silva, and Voss (2016) find that 
partisanship plays a significant role in determining how collective action frames 
influence public opinion about a movement or its goals. Within the social identity 
framework used here, we would suspect that public support for a politicized movement 
following a protest will increase for copartisans and decrease for opposed partisans 
through the same threat and emotional processes described earlier. What is unclear is 
(a) how such tactics will influence moderates and non-partisans and (b) which of those 
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tactics will have the greatest effect. These are vital questions, however. Research shows 
that public opinion is a vital step for movements to achieve policy change, yet the 
effects of various types of protest and how they are moderated by the increasingly 
dominant identity of partisanship are unclear or unexplored entirely. Therefore, for my 
third research question I evaluate the relative effects of protest on public opinion and 
how those effects are moderated by partisanship. As with previous chapters, I 
disentangle these effects using three separate research questions with accompanying 
analyses:  
RQ1: Does exposure to protest increase support? 
RQ2: Is the effect of protest on support conditioned by the type of protest? 
RQ3: Is the  effect of protest support conditioned by the type of protest and partisan 
identity?  
Results 
The dependent variables in this study are four self-reported items on support for the 
protest and willingness to sign a petition in support of a protest group associated with a 
protest. The details of these items are explained in the methods section. For the first 
outcome, respondents were asked to report agreement or disagreement with four 
questions regarding support or opposition to the protest described in the treatment 
vignettes. The final dependent variable for support is a composite of the four items 
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(alpha = .94). The second outcome—willingness to sign a petition in support of a 
protest—required respondents to report whether they would be willing to sign a 
petition in support of a protest. This is coded as a dummy variable with “1” for “yes” 
and “0” for “no.” These questions are re-presented in table 14 below. 
Table 18. Dependent variables for movement support 
DV1: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements on the protestors you 
just read about? 
 
1) If they achieve their goals, people like me would be better off 
2) I share their beliefs and values 
3) They represent people like me 
4) I support the protestor’s cause 
 
A: Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree 
 
DV2: Would you like to sign a petition in support of the protesters? If you select "yes", 
you will be directed to a petition from the group at the completion of the survey. 
 
A: Yes, no 
 
Tables 19 and 20 show the mean values of the two dependent variables used in this 
study. Table 19 shows the mean values for the Democratic-leaning movement. Overall 
support is modest, and, as expected, highest amongst Democrats for both variables. 
Interestingly, Republicans have nearly the same level of stated support as Independents 
and are much more willing to sign a petition in support of the Democratic climate 
change protest group.  
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Table 19. Mean values for movement support (Democratic movement) 
 Stated support (aggregate measure) Petition 
Pooled sample 3.50 .35 
Republicans 3.29 .38 
Independents 3.36 .24 
Democrats 3.89 .47 
 
Table 20 shows the mean values for the Republican-leaning movement. Overall support 
for this group is lower than the Democratic-leaning movement, suggesting that the 
partisan effects do not offset. The Republican movement simply does not have the same 
legitimacy as the Democratic movement, an issue to which I’ll return later.  
Table 20. Mean values for movement support (Republican movement) 
 Stated support (aggregate measure) Petition 
Pooled sample 3.01 .29 
Republicans 3.19 .47 
Independents 2.88 .19 
Democrats 3.31 .37 
 
Turning to analyses, for models on stated support I use ordinary least squares 
regression. For models on willingness to sign petition I use logistic regression with odds 
ratios reported for the coefficients. The independent variables in this case are consistent 
with the pattern used in chapter five: in table 21, the independent variable is a pooled 
dummy variable where “1” represents all treatment conditions and “0” represents the 
control condition. In tables 22-24, the independent variables are the six treatment 
conditions with a control reference condition.  
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In the first analysis I pool the treatment conditions and compare them to a control 
condition in correspondence with research question 1: 
RQ1: Does exposure to protest increase support? 
What we see is that protest is not uniformly effective at shifting stated support in either 
direction. It is apparent, however, that protest does have a negative effect on 
willingness to sign a petition in support, with respondents in the treatment conditions 
only 78% as likely to sign a petition compared to the control group.  
Table 21. Regressions on support outcomes (pooled treatments) 
 Model 1: 
Support1 
Model 2:  
Willingness to sign petition2 
 B (SE) B (SE) 
Protest 0.01 (0.07) 0.78 (0.09)* 
Constant 3.29 (0.06)** 0.54 (0.05)** 
N =  1,651 1650 
* p < .05; **p < .01 
1Coefficient should be interpreted as the average difference between the treatment group and the reference condition 
(control group—see methods section for discussion of treatments and controls).  
2Coefficient is reported as an odds ratio; that is, the percentage difference in willingness to sign petition in support of 
protest between treatment and control conditions.  
 
As stated in research question two, however, it is unlikely that all protest exhibits the 
same effect on support:  
RQ2: Is the effect of protest on support conditioned by the type of protest? 
In table 22, I show how different types of protest differentially shift support. What we 
see is that five of the six treatment conditions influence support, with only the non-
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disruptive Republican-oriented treatment having a null effect. However, the directions 
are not the same, explaining the null effect in the pooled sample: each of the three 
Democratic-oriented treatments have a positive effect. Importantly, the non-disruptive 
protest has approximately twice the effect on support that the violent or non-violent 
disruptive protest has. The Republican oriented protest, on the other hand, has a 
negative effect on support, with support declining for respondents exposed to both the 
violent and non-violent, disruptive treatments. The violent treatment produced twice 
the decrease of the disruptive, non-violent treatment. Effects are also observed for 
willingness to sign a petition. Respondents who were exposed to the violent Republican 
oriented protest were 48% as likely to sign a petition as those in the control group, while 
respondents exposed to the non-violent disruptive Republican oriented protest were 
63% as likely. No difference was observed for the Republican oriented non-disruptive, 
which means it was more effective than the violent or non-violent disruptive protests. 
No effect was observed for Democratic oriented protests of any type. 
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Table 22. Regressions on protest support (disaggregated treatments) 
 Model 1: 
Support1 
Model 2:  
Willingness to sign petition2 
 B (SE) B (SE) 
Dem-Violent 0.23 (0.10)* 0.95 (0.17) 
Rep-Violent -0.56 (0.10)** 0.48 (0.09)** 
Dem-Disrupt 0.28 (0.10)** 0.94 (0.16) 
Rep-Disrupt -0.30 (0.10)** 0.63 (0.12)* 
Dem-Cooperative 0.50 (0.10)** 1.11 (0.20) 
Rep-Cooperative -0.07 (0.10) 0.69 (0.13) 
Constant 3.29 (0.06)** 0.54 (0.05)** 
N =  1,651 1,650 
* p < .05; **p < .01 
1Coefficient should be interpreted as the average difference between the treatment group and the reference condition 
(control group—see methods section for discussion of treatments and controls).  
2Coefficient is reported as an odds ratio; that is, the percentage difference in willingness to sign petition in support of 
protest between treatment and control conditions.  
 
Of course, consistent with the preceding chapters, I am primarily interested in how 
partisanship interacts with protest styles to influence support, thus research question 
three:  
RQ3: Is the effect of protest support conditioned by the type of protest and partisan 
identity?  
As depicted in table 23, when I segment the analysis, I find that the effects are largely 
driven by Independent and Democratic respondents. The only observed effect for 
Republicans is lower protest support when they observe a violent, Republican-oriented 
protest. Independents respond positively to both disruptive (but non-violent) and non-
disruptive Democratic protests and respond negatively to disruptive Republican-
oriented protests. Democrats respond positively to both disruptive, non-violent and 
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non-disruptive Democratic protests and respond negatively to violent Republican-
oriented protest. 
Importantly, the effects are not equivalent between categories. For both Democrats and 
Independents, the positive effects of Democratic oriented protest are greater for the 
non-disruptive than the disruptive non-violent protest. Likewise, the negative effects of 
protest are strongest for violent protest.  
Table 23. OLS regression on protest support with partisan affiliations 
 Model 2:  
Republicans only 
Model 3: 
Independents only 
Model 4:  
Democrats only 
 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Dem-Violent 0.10 (0.21) 0.26 (0.15) 0.27 (0.18) 
Rep-Violent -0.49 (0.20)* -0.42 (0.14) -0.82 (0.18)* 
Dem-Disrupt -0.11 (0.20) 0.33 (0.15)* 0.48 (0.17)** 
Rep-Disrupt 0.05 (0.19) -0.36 (0.15)* -0.61 (0.18) 
Dem-Cooperative -0.09 (0.20) 0.85 (0.14)** 0.61 (0.20)** 
Rep-Cooperative -0.14 (0.21) -0.01 (0.14) 0.03 (0.20) 
Constant 3.31 (0.12)** 3.04 (0.09)** 3.61 (0.11)** 
N =  451 722 478 
*p < .10; ** p < .05; ***p < .01 
All coefficients should be interpreted as the average difference between the treatment group and the reference 
condition (control group—see methods section for discussion of treatments and controls).  
 
When I apply the segmentation to willingness to sign a petition, it becomes clear that 
the negative effect of the violent, Republican-oriented protest is consistent across all 
partisan categories, but that the effect of the non-violent disruptive protest is isolated to 
Democrats. Across each category, the violent, Republican-oriented protest lowers 
willingness to sign a petition by approximately 50%. Likewise, Democrats are only 42% 
as likely as the control condition to sign a petition in support of a Republican-oriented 
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disruptive, non-violent protest. None of the protest styles increase the likelihood of a 
respondent signing a petition in comparison with the control group.  
Table 24. Logistic regression on willingness to sign protest petition with partisan affiliations 
 Model 2:  
Republicans only 
Model 3: 
Independents only 
Model 4:  
Democrats only 
 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Dem-Violent 1.09 (0.38) 0.89 (0.28) 0.91 (0.27) 
Rep-Violent 0.44 (0.15)* 0.51 (0.17)* 0.49 (0.16)* 
Dem-Disrupt 0.86 (0.29) 0.78 (0.25) 1.12 (0.33)  
Rep-Disrupt 0.94 (0.29) 0.54 (0.19) 0.42 (0.14)* 
Dem-Cooperative 0.83 (0.28) 1.34 (0.38) 1.39 (0.47) 
Rep-Cooperative 0.58 (0.21) 0.79 (0.24) 0.81 (0.28) 
Constant 0.66 (0.13)** 0.32 (0.05)** 0.84 (0.15)** 
N= 451 721 478 
* p < .05; **p < .01 
Coefficients are reported as odds ratios; that is, the percentage difference in willingness to sign petition in support of 
protest between treatment and control conditions.  
 
Discussion 
Clearly, protest has an effect on public support. But what is the pattern such effects 
take? Violent protest is clearly ineffective at shifting public support. Each partisan 
group was approximately 50% less likely to sign a petition in support of a violent 
protest compared to the control condition. Violent protest exhibited a negative effect on 
public support for both Republican and Democrats—for the latter, it occurred for both 
ingroup and outgroup protest, while the former an effect was observed for the ingroup 
protest.  
However, the pattern of our findings demonstrates something unexpected. Rather than 
the success of the protest being dependent on whether the respondent was a member of 
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the ingroup or outgroup, the only positive effects occurred for the Democratic-oriented 
protest. For both Independents and Democrats, the disruptive, non-violent and non-
disruptive protests generated increased support, with no effect on Republicans. 
However, we see that the only effects generated by the Republican oriented protest 
were negative. Given that the details of the protest were held constant and only the 
position of the protestors was changed within protest types, we might surmise that the 
reason for this directional pattern is that the Republican-oriented protests were not seen 
as legitimate.  
Recent research suggests that legitimacy is a key moderating variable in determining 
the effectiveness of protest (Wang and Piazza 2016; Simpson, Willer, and Feinberg 
2018).  Simply, when a movement is seen as illegitimate, bystanders tend to identify less 
with the group and believe the group less reasonable. It is plausible that the 
Republican-oriented protest is simply seen as less legitimate in this case, particularly 
given the lower levels of movement support depicted in tables 23 and 24 and the 
surprisingly high level of support for the Democratic protest amongst Republicans. 
Even though Republicans tend to be less likely to believe in anthropogenic climate 
change, the vast majority of our sample does believe that climate change is happening 
(89.14%), including 79.85% of Republicans. This may explain the unexpected pattern of 
responses observed here. The reason that Republicans display negative reactions to 
Republican-oriented protests is that while they may not believe action should be taken 
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to address climate change, they do not necessarily identify with active efforts to oppose 
policies that address a problem they believe exists.  
What is clear from these findings is that the largest and most consistent positive effects 
for protest support occur when movements are non-disruptive and non-violent and, I 
suspect, are seen as legitimate. Importantly, we do observe that disruptive but non-
violent protest has a positive effect on movement support, even for Independents. This 
may represent a sort of tradeoff for protest organizers: organizers realize that some 
level of disruption is likely necessary to gain public attention in the first place and may 
be willing to sacrifice the marginal gains in public support from less disruptive protest 
if it means that they are able to garner media coverage. It is well established that some 
level of disruption is necessary to gain media coverage and reach the public in the first 
place. Thus, disruptive but non-violent tactics represent a middle ground between 
maximizing public support and gaining media coverage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
109 
 
Conclusion: A place for perverse movement effects 
While analyses were partitioned for clarity, this somewhat obscures the broader 
contributions of this work. Taken together the preceding analyses make several 
contributions to our shared understanding of protest, social movements, and partisan 
polarization, which I’ll now explore in some depth.  
The simplest of these contributions is to demonstrate how critical the partisan nature of 
modern protest is in understanding its effects. On the one hand, study number three 
shows that the effectiveness of protest is not uniform along party identification. When I 
disaggregate the effects of the treatments on support, I find that the effects were largely 
isolated to one party and not the other. On the other hand, study number one shows 
that partisanship interacts with protest to create a kind of perverse effect: widening 
social polarization. Taken together, the results of these studies suggest that partisanship 
has a quite wide-ranging impact on how protest is experienced by the public.  
This project set out to engage with a long-standing interest in the activist paradox. 
Activists are often caught between competing effects of their tactics. For instance, a 
tactic may produce public sympathy, but it may also produce a violent backlash from 
authorities. McAdam and Su (2002) argue that understanding these apparent paradoxes 
is a critical challenge for social movement scholars. In their words, the field should 
attend “…much more closely to the dynamic relationships among tactics, targets, and 
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the ways in which certain outcomes (e.g., the successful courting of media attention 
through victimization) may preclude others (policymaker support for policy change)… 
Only at attending to the variable patterning of such findings can we begin to 
understand the general dilemmas confronting social movements and the generic 
mechanisms on which these dilemmas may turn.” (p. 717).  
This paradox has indeed been observed in a range of recent scholarship. Bloemraad, 
Silva and Voss (2016) find a similar paradox in the study of collective action frames. 
They find that collective action frames can simultaneously deepen support amongst a 
sympathetic base but reduce support amongst moderates and opposed groups. Other 
research notes the ways in which movements face a tradeoff between disruption and 
public support specifically (see Wang and Piazza 2016 for discussion; also, Miller, 
Feinberg, and Willer 2018). My work here suggests that as it relates to social 
polarization, activists face no such paradox. The tactics most likely to increase support 
and exhibit the largest effects are non-disruptive and non-violent. These are also the 
tactics least likely to widen social polarization and exhibit the smallest effects. My 
findings, in conjunction with other recent work (Simpson, Willer, and Feinberg 2018), 
also challenge McAdam and Su’s (2002) arguments that violent and disruptive tactics 
are the most effective at shifting public opinion. At the very least, these recent findings 
ought to cause hesitation amongst activists who believe in the efficacy of such tactics.  
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The combined findings of this study suggest that understanding the relationship 
between social movements and politics—from the behavior of parties to individual 
voting behavior—requires we be attentive to social identity processes. Movements and 
politics are vehicles of collective identity, and the foundation of their relationship is one 
of overlapping and cross-cutting groups. As our identities become increasingly sorted 
under partisan banners, movements will follow. Partisanship will then act as a filter 
through which most movement actions will be understood and will interact with 
patterns of contention in potentially deleterious ways. Rather than seeing movements as 
centripetal forces, as social movement scholars implicitly do today, movements may 
instead become powerfully centrifugal forces, pushing society further and further apart.  
This calls to mind Hayek’s (1988) notion of the fatal conceit of intellectuals, which is that 
emancipatory action does not necessarily lead to positive social change. Our collective 
actions have both intended and unintended effects, and it is the “fatal conceit” of social 
movement activists and movement scholars that the effects of movements are uniformly 
or on balance positive. This study begins a process of challenging this conceit. As I have 
demonstrated here, the effects of a movement may be quite “perverse.” That is, in 
attempting to address an injustice or social problem, activists simultaneously contribute 
to another significant social problem (polarization). While this study cannot address the 
balance of such tradeoffs, it calls attention to a critical research need: to begin to explore 
the perverse effects of social movements. We must acknowledge our untested 
112 
 
assumptions about the centripetal force of social movements lest we risk perpetuating a 
centrifugal force instead. This is, in the author’s view, the most important contribution of this 
study. I’ve demonstrated at least one way in which social movement produce a perverse 
effect, raising the bigger question, “what other perverse effects do movements have?” 
To close this dissertation, I offer the beginnings of a framework for understanding 
perverse effects and considering their overlap with existing notions of movement 
impacts. To begin this process, we need to make clear what perverse effects are not. 
First, perverse outcomes are distinct from mere setbacks. No social movement has ever 
succeeded so well as to encounter zero resistance. As a point of fact, there would be no 
reason for a movement to exist if there was not an established authority failing to 
address collective grievances and resisting such effort. All social movements provoke 
resistance that will stifle efforts at achieving explicit goals. A primary distinction then, 
between mere setbacks and perverse outcomes, is that setbacks are failures to achieve a 
goal. For instance, when a grassroots anti-fracking organization fails to pass a zoning 
ordinance banning the industry, they are experiencing a setback. A failure to achieve a 
goal is not a perverse effect, it is the absence of an effect. Simply, perverse effects are not 
null effects. A perverse effect is a clear reaction either: (A) against the movement itself 
or (B) in response to the movement but outside of its intended milieu. What setbacks 
and perverse effects have in common, however, is that they are both unintentional. 
They are, in fact, the opposite of the intention of the movement. In this way, they are a 
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subset of the unintentional effects identified by other scholars (Giugni and Bosi, 2012, 
Bosi, Giugni, Uba, 2016), though as I will argue, perverse effects are defined by more 
than their unintentionality.  
Perverse effects are also beyond the scope of anticipation. They are effects produced 
from social movement activity that could not reasonably be anticipated by movement 
actors. Social movements operate in inherently complex systems where the effects will 
often be incomprehensible to actors within them (Perrow, 1984). This is not the same as 
claiming an outcome is unintentional; a wide range of unintended outcomes could 
occur that would be entirely predictable by the movement, including something as 
simple as failure to achieve an explicit goal such as passing an ordinance or defeating a 
piece of legislation. These are unintended outcomes, but they are certainly anticipatable. 
For instance, perverse effects are not the same as repression. Giugni and Bosi (2012), in 
briefly describing perverse effects, discuss police repression as an example of 
“unintended and perverse effects”. We agree that repression is unintended, but it is 
often anticipatable in that it is predictable in many cases, and therefore does not fit 
within the meaning of perverse outcomes. Countermovements and resistance from 
established authority are routine and anticipatable consequences for social movement 
actors and organizations. However, other forms of repression may be beyond the scope 
of anticipation, including violence. The recent attack on peaceful protesters in 
Charlottesville, Virginia is a case in point. Protesters were attacked by a member of 
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white nationalist organization, an escalation that could not have been reasonably 
anticipated by participants at the rally. A more historical example is the counter-
intelligence operations against New Left and Black Power movements in the 1960’s 
sanctioned by the FBI (Cunningham, 2003).  
Perverse outcomes are often unanticipated because they take many years to occur. 
Indeed, they may not be directly observable at all to actors within a given contentious 
episode. This is because the effects may take years to accumulate, or because the effects 
are so far outside the contended space that they are merely unseen. Indeed, if this were 
not the case—that perverse effects were easily observed—movements would be keen to 
avoid them altogether. Simply, perverse consequences exist precisely because they are 
unseen and unanticipated. This is consistent with case study research that has 
emphasized how the effects of movements vary over extended periods of time, even 
within similar contexts (McAdam and Boudet, 2012; Freudenburg and Gramling, 1994; 
Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen, 2000). 
Being unanticipatable and unintended is not sufficient for an outcome to be perverse. 
Outcomes that fit the first two criteria could actually be positive, fitting the goals of the 
movement. An example of this type may be unexpected surges in support following a 
repressive act by a powerful regime. I call this criteria desirability. We can think of a 
desirable outcome as one that promotes the cause of the movement, leads to 
improvement in life course metrics, or promotes some broader democratic attitudes, 
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norms, or processes, etc. Perverse outcomes, on the other hand, entail undesirable 
outcomes. Undesirable outcomes derail or harm the movement and/or its members, 
produce policy or institutional change that punishes the movement and makes their 
future efforts less likely to succeed, or promotes anti-democratic attitudes, norms, or 
processes.  
What of the locus of perverse effects? Perverse effects need not accrue to only the 
movement itself. Perverse effects can also be accrued externally, in other social systems 
or by non-movement actors. Given that social movements often have as a subtextual 
mission to promote democratic process, one critical potential perverse effect can relate 
to the functioning of the democratic system broadly. The aforementioned Dakota 
Access Pipeline protests in North Dakota provide a strong example. Protests over the 
DAPL led several states to push legislation that would have limited liability for drivers 
who hit protesters assembling in the street. This, of course, was directly targeted at 
ongoing protests, but it would have had smothering effects for future efforts at public 
assembly. Partisan polarization, analyzed in this study, is another external perverse 
effect.  
Critically, it should not be taken from this description that perverse outcomes are 
absolute barriers to movement success. The Southern civil rights movement provoked 
enormous physical harm for its participants and led to the escalation of suppressive and 
violent behavior of the established authorities the movement was resisting. Yet, the 
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movement was able to achieve considerable success, though these perverse outcomes 
may have been successful in suppressing participation and may have reduced the 
movement’s possible degrees of success.  
Social movement scholars who have worked to link social movements to democratic 
systems have at least partially hinted at the existence perverse outcomes. Tilly (2003) 
argues that anti-democratic movements can promote democracy by unintentionally 
spurring pro-democratic counter movements, not unlike recent surges in democratic 
activism following the 2016 U.S. presidential election. More recently, in analyzing 
partisan polarization in the U.S., McAdam and Kloos (2014) refer to a clear case of 
perverse movement effects as “ironic”, obfuscating the generalizable nature of the 
findings. Indeed, McAdam’s findings regarding the relationship between the 
segregationist and civil rights movements and their roles in generating partisan 
polarization is perhaps the strongest social movement study to date in demonstrating 
how perverse effects can be forged. Amenta et al. (2010) refer to how movements can 
“do worse than fail”, but again fails to problematize or even bother to elaborate on this 
particular condition. In the same article, the authors describe only one case study which 
they define as having “negative” outcomes, or what we label here as undesirable. 
Andrews (2004) notes, “…a movement could have counterproductive effects—for 
example, if a campaign led to increasing surveillance or imprisonment of activists or 
bystanders.” (p. 17) 
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To be clear, perverse outcomes can only be understood by considering the perspective 
of a movement. A perverse outcome is one that backfires on the explicit or implicit 
goals and beliefs of the movement. I previously mentioned the DAPL protests and 
legislation targeted as protesters. This legislation was a perverse effect for two reasons: 
1) it attempted to squelch that particular movement; and 2) it would have had a chilling 
effect on future protests beyond the scope of the DAPL protests. Given the explicitly 
democratic structure of the protest—it was directly seeking voice for underrepresented 
persons—the broader effect of the legislation undermines the implicit beliefs of the 
movement, above and beyond the movement’s explicit goals. However, we should not 
assume that only pro-democratic, liberal movements can experience perverse outcomes. 
The anti-civil rights countermovement in the American South in the 1960’s used violent 
and visceral techniques to repress civil rights protesters. The images of these violent 
countermovement tactics helped to galvanize national support for the civil rights 
movement (Garrow, 1978). This clearly is a perverse outcome from the perspective of 
Bull Connor and Henry Wallace.  
Bosi, Giugni, and Uba (2016) inadvertently offer some insight into why perverse 
outcomes are generally missed by social movement scholars. They emphasize that to 
understand the outcomes of movements, scholars need to “refocus the analysis on the 
targets of protest, that is, those who are supposed to respond.” (p. 15) This is a useful 
piece of advice for those interested in standard social movement outcomes related to 
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policy or other external loci, but it is also a way to narrow the scope of vision of what a 
movement actually impacts. Movements are so pervasive in Western society that we 
should expect them to have a wide range of impacts on surprising objects and 
processes, far beyond those which are the target of the movement or protest itself. 
Similar to the argument made by McAdam and Boudet (2012), it is possible that 
movement scholars have been selecting on the dependent variable by focusing largely 
on desirable movement outcomes, ignoring or failing to see the ways in which 
movements create adverse effects. This is evidenced in the aforementioned review piece 
by Amenta et al. (2010), which identified only one study of undesirable outcomes.  
So, before parting this manuscript, I will offer the reader a simple definition of a 
perverse movement effect with the hope that this definition and the preceding 
elaboration leads to greater interest in the subject. A perverse social movement outcome 
can be defined as follows:  
An effect attributable to movement actions (frames, protests, etc.) that is 
both (a) unanticipated and (b) counterproductive to the explicit or implicit 
goals and values of the claimant.  
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